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EDITORIAL
The external headwinds that the euro-area 
economy has been facing for several months 
have gathered strength.   
Firstly, uncertainties about the duration of the 
financial turmoil, the ultimate scale of its costs 
and the location of the losses have intensified 
and continue to affect investor confidence.  
While the ECB and other major central banks 
have taken decisive action to stabilise money 
markets, the functioning of these markets has not 
yet returned to normal. Banks are still reluctant 
to lend to each other at longer maturities, and the 
use of central-bank lending facilities remains 
much higher than usual. Meanwhile, other key 
credit markets are disrupted. The fear of losses 
from defaults on US sub-prime mortgages 
remains pervasive and evidence also suggests that 
defaults have spread to other sectors of the US 
economy. Problems are emerging with higher 
quality US residential mortgages, as well as with 
commercial mortgages, automobile loans and 
credit-card debt.  
Substantial asset write-downs have implied 
corresponding capital losses for banks and 
triggered a re-capitalisation in several cases –
often involving investments by sovereign wealth 
funds. Amid the need to rebuild capital and the 
prospect of reduced earnings, there has been a 
generalised tightening in bank lending standards 
in the US and in Europe but not yet so in 
emerging markets.  
Secondly, recent data for the US points to a more 
severe contraction of the housing sector than 
previously expected and, according to most 
private sector analysts, the US economy is 
already in, or is on the brink of, a recession. 
Looking ahead, it is difficult to say whether the 
US economy will rebound relatively quickly or 
whether the downturn will be more protracted.  
Given the importance of the US economy and 
the international linkages through the trade 
channel and financial markets, the rest of the 
world will not be immune. In the case of the 
euro area, the impact of the US downturn will 
also depend on developments in exchange rates. 
In this respect, excessive volatility and disorderly 
movements in exchange rates are undesirable for 
economic growth and, in the present 
circumstances, excessive exchange rate moves are 
a source of concern.  
Finally, inflation pressures from surging energy 
and food prices represent another downside risk 
to the outlook. Oil prices remain high and 
volatile, driven by limited spare capacity, robust 
demand from emerging markets and geopolitical 
tensions in oil-producing countries. According to 
the futures market, they will remain very high 
this year. Prices of non-fuel commodities, 
however, are now expected to stabilise.  
These combined headwinds have begun to take a 
toll on euro-area GDP growth which decelerated 
from 2.6% year-on-year in the third quarter of 
last year to 2.2% year-on-year in the fourth 
quarter. They also led us to revise our growth 
projections downwards in our Interim Forecast 
released on 21 February to 1.8% for 2008 as a 
whole. This is 0.4 pp lower than projected in the 
2007 Autumn Forecast. The most recent hard 
and soft data released since the publication of the 
interim forecast are consistent with this 
projection.  
Having discussed downside risks, it is also 
important to emphasise the range of factors that 
will continue to support the euro-area economy 
during the course of the year and help it to 
weather the adverse external shocks. First, the 
euro area will continue to benefit from strong 
growth in emerging markets. Although a full 
decoupling from the US slowdown is unlikely, 
emerging markets are showing considerable 
resilience. Second, the euro area can count on the 
solid fundamentals of its economy, including 
robust labour market dynamics, healthy 
profitability and resilient investment. The 
absence of major macroeconomic imbalances 
(with, in particular, a balanced current account 
and an appropriate level of savings) also reduces 
its vulnerability to negative shocks. Third, 
although the rise in inflation has dampened 
households' purchasing power, its effect on 
consumption growth should fade progressively 
provided that second-round effects do not 
compound current price pressures.  
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The focus section of this report looks at an issue 
which has recently attracted renewed attention 
from economists and policy makers: the possible 
lessons of European economic and monetary 
integration for the process of regional integration 
in Asia. Greater intra-regional monetary and 
financial stability in East Asia would obviously be 
beneficial for the countries concerned. It would 
also be in the interest of the euro area and the 
global financial system, particularly if it could 
help support a more orderly unwinding of global 
imbalances where the euro would not have to 
bear an excessive weight of the exchange rate 
adjustment as is the case today. 
The Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s has 
provided some momentum to economic 
integration in East Asia but progress has so far 
been uneven. While trade integration has 
increased rapidly, financial and monetary 
cooperation has advanced considerably more 
slowly.  
In the field of monetary cooperation, the most 
advanced institutional process developed by East 
Asian countries so far is the so-called Chiang Mai 
Initiative (CMI). This collection of 17 bilateral 
swap agreements seems, however, to have 
exhausted its role. The bilateral swap agreements 
have never been activated and Asian countries 
have accumulated huge currency reserves, which 
may signal a lack of confidence in the credibility 
of the system.  
There is therefore a need to give new momentum 
to the integration process and to put in place 
mechanisms that could help the region face 
currency turmoil effectively and reduce its 
exposure to global imbalances. Asia’s recent 
decision to study the possibility of a multilateral 
swap arrangement can be seen as a step in that 
direction. Economists have also begun to discuss 
possible moves towards closer monetary and 
exchange rate cooperation with a view to full 
monetary and economic union.  
Regarding lessons that can be drawn from the 
European monetary integration, it is necessary to 
stress the profound differences in political and 
economic conditions between the two regions. 
The global context is today also very different 
from the situation prevailing when monetary 
unification started in Europe. The integration 
steps followed by Europe clearly cannot be 
replicated in East Asia. Nevertheless, as argued in 
this Report, the European experience can 
provide some useful lessons, as on many issues, 
the European integration process transcends the 
local historical experience. In particular, it points 
to two major challenges facing further monetary 
integration in Asia. 
First, real and nominal convergence is still elusive 
in Asia and on many counts Asia is not at the 
stage of integration where Europe was when it 
began its monetary integration process. This is 
particularly so in fields such as cross-border 
labour market mobility, regional financial 
integration, regulatory harmonisation and 
business cycle synchronisation. On the other 
hand, East Asian intra-regional trade has 
increased significantly in recent years and may be 
similar to that of Europe in the late 1980s. And, 
the European experience shows that the 
monetary integration process itself tends to bring 
countries concerned closer to an Optimum 
Currency Area. To be viable, however, further 
exchange rate and monetary integration will 
require important structural changes in the 
economies concerned.  
Second, monetary integration calls for strong 
political commitment and adequate governance. 
The determination of the political leadership in 
East Asian countries to bring economic policy in 
line with the requirements of such an integration 
scheme appears weak at this stage. Furthermore, 
effective surveillance mechanisms are not in 
place. Effective surveillance, based on some form 
of institutional cooperation, is a pre-condition 
for the successful achievement of exchange rate 
and monetary coordination. This is probably the 
most important hurdle on the way to further 
monetary integration in East Asia. 
 
Klaus REGLING  
DIRECTOR GENERAL  
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I. Economic situation in the euro area 
Activity in the euro area has now clearly started to soften under the combined effects of surging oil prices, continued financial 
market turbulence and slowing global trade growth. GDP growth decelerated to 0.4% (q-o-q) in the last quarter of 2007. 
This deceleration owes much to a significant weakening of private consumption, mostly attributable to unfavourable 
developments in consumer prices. A comforting development was the continuation of strong growth in investment spending 
(0.8% q-o-q), explained by high capacity utilisation and the high profitability of the non-financial corporate sector. According 
to the Commission’s Interim Forecast of February 2008, economic growth in the euro area is expected to slow down to 1.8% 
for 2008, a 0.4 pp downward revision compared to the 2007Autumn Forecast.  
Most OECD countries have experienced a sharp reduction in output growth volatility over the past three decades. 
Econometric analysis indicates that this ‘Great Moderation’ is not just the result of a long period of luck in the form of 
milder shocks. It can also partly be ascribed to improvements in economic policies, in particular more credible monetary policy 
and, to a lesser extent, more powerful automatic fiscal stabilisers. Policy improvements have been more substantial in 
countries, particularly some Southern euro-area Member States, where policy mistakes were particularly acute in the 1970s-
80s. In these countries, policy changes have made a comparatively larger contribution to the drop in output volatility.  
Reform data compiled in ECFIN's LABREF database suggest that labour market reforms put in place in the euro area in 
recent years have mainly aimed at increasing labour utilisation, especially of those groups with low participation rates (the 
outsiders). Reforms targeted at improving labour market flexibility also focused mainly on the outsiders, with little effort made 
to adapt employment regulation for insiders. Evidence shows that reforms have to some extent paid off, raising the average 
employment rates and enhancing the response of employment to cyclical shocks. However, the increased dualism of the euro-
area labour market may require further reform measures targeted at insiders rather than outsiders. 
While headline inflation in the euro area has increased significantly in recent months, inflation dispersion amongst euro-area 
Member States has also increased visibly since summer 2007. Although energy and food prices have accelerated in all 
Member States, the global shocks to oil and agricultural commodity prices have been transmitted to individual countries with 
varying intensity. This heterogeneity can be related to a range of factors, including country differences in the weight of food and 
energy in the national HICP basket, in the degree of competition in retail markets and in the cyclical position. Furthermore, 
the exchange rate pass-through to consumer prices has differed across euro-area Member States. 
1. Recent economic developments and 
short-term prospects1  
The financial sector remains in a state of 
flux… 
The global economic situation and outlook 
remain unusually uncertain at the beginning of 
2008 mainly due to the uncertainty about the 
extent, duration and impact of financial 
turbulence. While the ECB and other major 
central banks have taken decisive action to 
stabilise money markets, the functioning of these 
markets has not yet returned to normal. Hence, 
spreads on interbank markets remain elevated 
when compared with previous periods, indicating 
continued tensions. Beginning of March, the 
spread between the 3-month Euribor and the 3-
month treasury bills stood around 50 basis 
                                                     
1  The cut-off date for the statistics included in this issue 
was 14 March 2008. 
points, compared with 100 in December 2007 
(Graph 1).  
Graph 1: Euro-area money market 
(in % – 1 Jan 2007 to 14 Mar 2008) 
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Source: Ecowin. 
The financial turmoil has led to a clear tightening 
of monetary and financial conditions in the euro 
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area. The ECB has kept its policy rate unchanged 
since the summer but ECFIN's Monetary 
Conditions Indicator (which reflects real short-
term interest rates and the real exchange rate) has 
showed a continued tightening until December 
due to both higher short-term interbank interest 
rates and further appreciation of the euro 
(Graph 2). In January and February, the MCI 
loosened somewhat again, mainly due to the 
effect of higher inflation on real interest rates but 
also to a moderate fall in the spreads between 
interbank interest rates and risk-free alternatives. 
Graph 2: Euro area MCI and its contributors 
 (inverted scale – Jan 1999 – Feb 2008) 
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(1) Reel effective exchange rate. 
(2) Real interest rate. 
(3) Monetary Conditions Indicator. 
Source: Commission services. 
Problems in credit markets have been reflected in 
the balance sheets of euro-area banks. Many of 
these banks had retained significant exposure to 
credit risk in securitised products via off-balance-
sheet operations. These off-balance-sheet 
exposures, which were originally a source of 
liquidity problems for banks, have now become a 
problem for bank capital. The need to rebuild 
capital and the prospect of reduced earnings have 
led to a generalised tightening in bank lending 
standards. The January 2008 ECB's bank lending 
survey for the euro area reported a further sharp 
tightening of credit standards for loans to 
enterprises as well as to households – although 
the former were more affected than the latter. 
The survey also suggests that the tightening 
phase is not over as banks expect the financial 
turmoil to have a greater impact on credit 
standards in the first quarter of 2008 than over 
the previous three months. 
Graph 3: Corporate bond spreads, euro area 
 (basis points, 1 Mar 2007 – 14 Mar 2008) 
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Source: Commission services. 
The tightening of financial conditions is not 
confined to bank loans. Spreads on corporate 
Table 1: Euro-area growth components 
Forecast (1) 
 2007 Q1 
2007 
Q2 
2007 
Q3 
2007 
Q4 
Carryover 
to 2008 2007 (2) 2008 (2) 
 Percentage  change on previous period, volumes 
GDP 0.8 0.3 0.7 0.4 0.7 2.6 2.2 
Private consumption 0.0 0.6 0.5 -0.1 0.4 1.7 2.1 
Government consumption 1.1 0.2 0.7 -0.1 0.3 2.0 2.1 
Gross fixed capital formation 1.7 0.0 1.2 0.8 1.2 4.7 2.9 
Exports of goods and services 0.9 0.8 2.1 0.5 1.6 5.8 5.3 
Imports of goods and services 1.4 0.3 2.5 -0.4 1.0 5.3 5.5 
 Percentage point contribution to change in GDP 
Private consumption 0.0 0.4 0.3 0.0 0.2 1.0 1.2 
Government consumption 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.4 0.4 
Gross fixed capital formation 0.4 0.0 0.3 0.2 0.3 1.0 0.6 
Changes in inventories 0.4 -0.3 0.2 -0.1     -0.1 0.0 0.0 
Net exports -0.2 0.2 -0.1 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.0 
(1) Annual change in %.         (2) European Commission Autumn 2007 Forecasts. 
Source: Commission services. 
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bonds have widened to multi-year highs, mostly 
for lower rated bonds (Graph 3). In addition, the 
cost of insuring against debt default has soared to 
new highs. Finally, equity markets, which had 
shown remarkable resilience to the financial 
turmoil in the past months, have dropped by 
more than 15% since the beginning of the year. 
A significant softening of household 
spending…. 
The extent to which the financial turbulence has 
spilled over to the real economy in the euro area 
is difficult to assess at this juncture. The 
economy has in fact been hit simultaneously by a 
number of shocks, including surging commodity 
prices and a softening of world trade, the effects 
of which are difficult to disentangle. In any 
event, activity in the euro area has now clearly 
softened. GDP growth in the euro area 
decelerated to 0.4% (q-o-q) in the last quarter of 
2007, compared to 0.7% in the previous quarter, 
bringing y-o-y growth down to 2.2%. 
The GDP breakdown shows that the 
deceleration in the fourth quarter owes much to 
a significant weakening of private consumption. 
Household consumption dropped slightly (by 
0.1% q-o-q) after increasing by 0.5% in the third 
quarter. The weakening was broad-based at the 
country level, though much sharper in Germany 
(-0.8% q-o-q). It was clearly the consequence of 
rising consumer prices. In nominal terms, GDP 
and consumption increased at broadly similar 
rates both in the fourth quarter of 2007 and 
during the year as a whole. Consumption 
weakness is therefore mostly attributable to the 
deterioration of the terms of trade, i.e. 
unfavourable developments in consumer prices 
relative to the GDP deflator. Although the 
household savings ratio dropped marginally in 
the second and third quarters of last year, there is 
no sign that consumers have decided to cut their 
savings significantly to cushion the price shock, 
which is consequently fully transmitted into 
lower real consumption.2  
The most recent data paint a mixed picture of the 
ongoing dynamics in consumer spending. After 
three consecutive months of contraction, retail 
sales picked up again in January. Growth in 
consumer credit, while significantly below its 
2006 peak, also accelerated moderately in 
December and January. However, price pressures 
have not abated so far. According to Eurostat’s 
flash estimate, annual euro-area headline inflation 
was running at 3.3% in February, 0.1 pp higher 
than in January; i.e. the highest rate of inflation 
since 1999. The latest detailed breakdown of the 
HICP showed no sign of clear deceleration in the 
main drivers of the inflation bulge in February: 
energy inflation remains very high (10.4%), 
though slightly lower than in January (0.2 pp) 
while food inflation picked up to 5.2% from 
4.8% in January.  
                                                     
2  No data on households' savings is yet available for the 
fourth quarter.   
 Table 2: Selected euro-area and national leading indicators, 2007-2008 
 SENT. IND1) BCI2) OECD3) PMI Man.4) PMI Ser IFO6) NBB7) ZEW8)
Long-term average 100.0 -0.1 93.3 52..8 54.9 96.9   -6.5 21.0 
Trough in latest 
downturn 88.6 -0.92 98.1 46.4 47.7 90.3 -26.5 -41.6 
March 2007 110.6 1.47 107.8 55.4 57.4 103.2 -1.0 5.8 
April 2007 110.4 1.56 107.9 55.4 57.0 104.2 2.3 16.5 
May 2007 111.6 1.47 108.0 55.0 57.3 104.7 3.9 24 
June 2007 111.1 1.49 108.2 55.6 58.3 102.7 6.5 20.3 
July 2007 110.4 1.31 108.2 54.9 58.3 101.7 4.5 10.4 
August 2007 109.4 1.35 108.0 54.3 58.0 100.4 2.8 -6.9 
September 2007 106.3 1.07 107.4 53.2 54.2 98.7 1.4 -18.1 
October 2007 105.4 0.87 107.1 51.5 55.8 98.5 -1.8 -18.1 
November 2007 104.1 1.03 107.2 52.8 54.1 98.3 -0.5 -32.5 
December 2007 103.4 0.89 107.1 52.5 53.1 98.2 -1.8 -37.2 
January 2008 101.7 0.77 106.9 52.8 50.6 99.0 -0.8 -41.6 
February 2008 100.1 0.72 106.9 52.3 52.3 98.2 0.5 -39.5 
March 2008        -32.0 
1) Economic sentiment indicator, DG ECFIN. 2) Business climate indicator, DG ECFIN. 3) Composite leading indicator. 4) Reuters 
Purchasing Managers Index, manufacturing. 5)  Reuters Purchasing Manager Index, services. 6) Business expectations, West Germany. 7)  
National Bank of Belgium indicator for manufacturing. 8) ZEW Indicator of Economic Sentiment, Germany 
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Negative developments in purchasing power 
have clearly dented consumer sentiment. 
Consumer confidence has been gradually 
declining since May 2007 and now stands below 
its long-term average. The deterioration of 
sentiment has been primarily visible in rising 
worries about price developments and the 
general economic situation. Households have 
also reported a rise in perceived risks of 
unemployment but, reflecting continuous good 
news from the labour market, the weakening of 
confidence has been more modest in that area. 
Growth in employment remains robust and 
unemployment has continued its downward 
trajectory in recent months. 
Graph 4: Consumer confidence, euro area 
(Balance in % – Jan 2000 to Feb 2008) 
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Source: Commission services. 
Available data points to weak momentum in the 
other component of household spending, namely 
residential construction. Depending on the 
indicators considered, construction activity was 
either sluggish or contracting at the end of 2007 
and the fall in residential building permits has 
accelerated since the beginning of 2007. 
Confidence in the construction sector has been 
on a clear downward path since the autumn and 
ECB data points to a steady easing of residential 
property prices. These negative developments 
must however be interpreted against the 
background of robust growth in mortgage 
lending. The rate of expansion of mortgage 
lending has come down from its peak in 2006 
but continues to be strong with the latest data 
showing stable annual growth at 7.0% in January.  
…but also of world trade 
Weaker global growth, on the back of the 
financial market turmoil and the US slowdown, is 
now clearly weighing on world trade. Indeed, 
world trade has softened further in the last 
quarter of 2007. According to the CPB indicator, 
q-o-q world trade growth decelerated from 2.6% 
in 2007Q3 to 0.6% in 2007Q4. The loss in 
import momentum was broad-based although 
sharper in industrialised countries than in 
emerging markets. 
The softening of the world trade momentum, 
together with the appreciation of the euro, are 
weighing on euro-area exports but the extent of 
these effects is difficult to gauge. Euro-area q-o-q 
export growth decelerated sharply from 2.1% in 
2007Q3 to 0.5% in 2007Q4 but quarterly data 
tend to be volatile and the deceleration in exports 
was accompanied by a drop in imports (-0.4% q-
o-q in 2007Q4). As a result, net exports 
contributed strongly to GDP growth in 2007Q4 
(0.4 pp). As euro-area exports in national 
accounts cover both intra- and extra-area 
exports, it is difficult to say to what extent the 
slowdown in the fourth quarter reflects weakness 
in domestic or external demand. But 
manufacturing data suggests that domestic 
factors have dominated. First, in recent months, 
business confidence has weakened more 
markedly in services (which are less exposed to 
trade) than in the manufacturing sector. The 
January reading of industrial production was 
actually rather strong with y-o-y growth at 3.8%. 
Second, in the first 2008 issue of the European 
 
Table 3: Real GDP growth  
(Interim forecast February 2008) (1) 
 Quarterly GDP forecast (%, quarter-on-quarter)  
Annual GDP forecast 
(%, year-on-year) 2007 
 2008/1 2008/2 2008/3 2008/4 
Autumn 
forecast Nov. 
2007 
Interim 
forecast  
Feb. 2008 
Germany 0.1 0.3 0.4 0.4 2.1 1.6 
Spain 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.5 3.0 2.7 
France 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.3 2.0 1.7 
Italy 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.3 1.4 0.7 
Euro area 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 2.2 1.8 
(1) Where possible, the quarterly growth rates are working-day and seasonally-adjusted, whereas the annual projections are unadjusted. 
Source: Commission services. 
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Commission's quarterly manufacturing survey, 
companies reported a rebound of export 
expectations for the months ahead.  
Graph 5: World trade 
(y-o-y % changes in volume ; 2001Q1 –  2007Q4) 
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Looking ahead, surveys of the global economy 
point to a period of further moderation in trade 
growth in the coming months. The February 
reading of the quarterly World Economic Survey 
shows a further weakening of the current global 
economic situation but also a deterioration of its 
expectation component. In a similar vein, the 
February reading of the Global PMI indicator 
showed confidence in the global manufacturing 
sector at its lowest level since July 2003.  
Capital spending, however, is holding up 
fairly well 
A comforting development in the latest national 
accounts data was the continuation of strong 
growth in investment spending. Gross fixed 
capital formation increased by 0.8% q-o-q and 
contributed by 0.2 pp. to GDP growth. As 
developments in residential construction are 
likely to have been sluggish at best, the strong 
reading of investment can be primarily ascribed 
to the corporate sector.  
The strength of business investment is also 
visible in recent loan data. The annual growth 
rate of loans to non-financial corporations stood 
at 14.6% in January, up from 14.5% in 
December, the highest rate since 1990. Although 
the strong reading may partly reflect a re-
intermediation process in the wake of the 
financial turmoil, this effect is likely to have 
remained small. 3  
The resilience of investment can be explained by 
high capacity utilisation and the healthy financial 
position of the non-financial corporate sector.  
Capacity utilisation in the manufacturing sector, 
which has declined only slightly since the peak in 
the summer of 2007, remains well above its long-
term average (83.9%). The profit share of non-
financial corporations in the euro area has 
remained high (39.4% in 2007Q3). 
Graph 6: Business confidence indicators, euro area 
(Balance in % – Jan 2000 – Feb 2008) 
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Source: Commission services. 
Another factor which has supported investment 
spending is the fact that confidence in the 
manufacturing sector has generally held up fairly 
well in recent months. The IFO indicator has 
remained broadly stable in the past four months 
thanks to a stable assessment of both current 
conditions and business expectations. The 
Reuters PMI index for manufacturing activity has 
also remained broadly stable in the past few 
months. That neither the IFO nor the PMI 
shows a downward trend in expectations despite 
strong headwinds (financial markets, the US 
slowdown, etc.) is encouraging. In contrast, 
however, the European Commission's 
manufacturing survey has recently painted a 
more negative picture. It has pointed to a 
downward trend since April 2007 and has 
continued to decline in the past three months. 
Nevertheless, the latest reading remains at a fairly 
high level, consistent with moderate growth in 
the manufacturing sector.  
                                                     
3 ECB (2008), Monthly Bulletin, February, p.20.  
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Box 1: The impact of higher oil prices – simulations with the new version  
of the Commission's Quest model  
 
This box revisits the issue of the macroeconomic impact of oil prices on the basis of new model simulations.(*) The 
simulations were run with the latest version of ECFIN's macroeconomic QUEST model. QUEST Version III is a 
new multi-region model that includes an energy production sector and in which energy serves as an intermediate 
input in final good production.(**) The euro area and the other EU Member States, as well as the US and Asia, are 
modelled as net importers of oil and gas, while the rest of the world is the oil-exporting region. As European natural 
gas prices are de facto indexed to oil prices with a lag of up to six months, the model treats oil and gas together as 
one aggregate. The model treats the relative oil price as exogenously determined.  
Oil price shocks affect the economy through supply and demand channels. As terms-of-trade shocks, they have an 
impact on the economy through their effect on production decisions and relative prices. But oil price shocks also 
represent a shift in purchasing power between oil-exporting countries and oil-importing countries. An increase in 
energy prices leads to a loss in real income in oil-importing countries and affects consumers' and firms' spending on 
goods and services other than energy. The demand effects through this income channel are key to explaining the 
potentially significant impact of oil price changes on the economy. The model captures both supply and demand 
channels as energy serves as an input in the production process and is consumed directly by households. 
The table below presents two sets of simulations. The first one shows the impact of a gradual increase in oil prices of 
100% over a period of three years. This broadly corresponds to the increase registered between mid-2004 (€29 based 
on quarterly averages) and end-2007 (€63 based on quarterly averages). The second scenario takes the previous 
simulation as a new baseline and shows the effects of a further oil price increase of 25%. It illustrates the non-
linearities that characterise the growth effects of oil prices.  
 
 Table : Macroeconomic impact of gradual increase in oil prices 
(change from baseline scenario) 
 First scenario (1) Second scenario (2) 
 1st year 2nd year 3rd year 10th year 1st year 2nd year 3rd year 10th year 
GDP -0.23 -0.59 -0.88 -1.11 -0.21 -0.35 -0.34 -0.65 
Consumption -0.63 -1.47 -2.25 -3.41 -0.85 -1.13 -1.16 -1.89 
Investment -0.72 -1.68 -2.50 -3.45 -0.58 -0.92 -1.02 -1.77 
Exports 0.60 1.42 2.45 4.55 0.79 1.12 1.43 2.12 
Imports  -0.19 -0.80 -1.74 -5.92 -0.23 -0.77 -1.24 -3.13 
Real wages -0.11 -0.34 -0.62 -1.11 -0.11 -0.20 -0.28 -0.57 
Consumer price level 0.54 1.27 1.95 2.56 0.65 0.73 0.75 1.08 
Energy consumption  -0.27 -0.88 -1.70 -5.85 -0.22 -0.55 -0.84 -3.25 
1) the impact of a gradual increase in oil prices of 100 percent; 2) the impact of a further increase in oil prices of 25% 
 
In the first scenario, real GDP falls by 0.9% below baseline after three years and slightly more than 1% after 
10 years. The impact on consumption is much stronger, 2% lower after three years and 3% after 10 years. 
Investment declines by 2.5% after 3 years and 3.5% after 10 years. The increase in energy prices does not have a 
significant impact on energy consumption in the short run due to the small short-run elasticities of substitution, but 
energy consumption by households is 6% lower after ten years. The pass-through into consumer prices builds up 
gradually. Inflation picks up by 0.5 pp the first year and by 0.7 pp the second and third year so that consumer prices 
are 2% higher after three years. The current account deteriorates by up to 1.9% of GDP after three years due to the 
increasing deficit on the oil balance, but the non-oil balance improves due to higher exports to oil-exporting 
countries (recycling of oil revenues) and a depreciating exchange rate.  
The effects on GDP are significantly milder than those estimated with previous versions of the QUEST model. This 
reflects several differences with previous versions of the models. (1) First, oil-producing regions are now modelled in 
greater detail. This allows the recycling of higher oil revenues by oil producers into the euro area to be better taken 
into account. (2) Second-round wage effects are less strong than in the previous model as the effect of lower 
consumption on labour supply is now taken into account (i.e. workers partly try to recoup purchasing power losses 
by  raising their labour supply). (3) Oil consumption is now modelled explicitly allowing substitution between oil and 
other goods (although these substitution effects are assumed to be low in the short run).  
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In the second scenario, the negative impact on real GDP is around 0.2% in the first year, rising to 0.7% after 
10 years. The shock raises inflation and consumer prices are 0.8% above base after 3 years. This is substantially 
higher – and proportionally so – than the impact on GDP and inflation in the first scenario, indicating that the effect 
of oil price shocks is non-linear, i.e. larger when the starting price level is higher. A 25% price hike when oil prices 
are already at €60 per barrel represents a larger shock in euros than when oil prices are at €30 per barrel. This leads to 
a stronger income effect and a relatively larger impact on demand. 
 
As is the case with any simulations, the results of the simulations presented here should be interpreted with prudence 
as they are model-dependent and sensitive to some modelling assumptions. In that respect two sources of 
uncertainties should be highlighted. First, the impact of oil price shocks on the economy depends crucially on how 
wages respond to the worsening of the terms-of-trade. The increase in consumer prices puts upward pressure on 
wages, but lower economic activity reduces wage demands and counteracts this. The overall effect on wages is the 
net outcome from these opposing forces. In the default setting of the model, wages decline (relative to the baseline 
growth) in line with the fall in productivity. However, earlier experiences of large oil price shocks have shown that 
there can be strong resistance to such wage flexibility and wage demands could rise in response to sharp increases in 
energy prices. If wages were to rise, output and employment losses could be much larger. Second, the magnitude of 
the effects of oil price shocks on the economy also depends on the price elasticity of oil demand. If it is easier to 
substitute away from energy, the real impact on the economy will be smaller. 
(*) For previous assessments of the impact of oil prices on the economy see:  
European Commission (2004), 'How vulnerable is the euro-area economy to higher oil prices?', Quarterly Report on the Euro Area, Vol. 3 No. 2.  
European Commission (2005), 'The impact of higher oil prices on inflation', Quarterly Report on the Euro Area, Vol. 4 No. 4. 
(**)QUEST III belongs to the modern class of Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) models that now serve as the foundation for 
macroeconomic policy analysis.  
 
Commission's Interim Forecast points to a 
significant deceleration of growth in 2008 
According to the Commission’s Interim Forecast 
of February 2008, economic growth in the euro 
area is expected to slow down to 1.8% for 2008 
as a whole. This represents a 0.4 pp downward 
revision compared with the 2.2% projected in the 
2007 Autumn Forecast. The revisions mainly 
reflect the impact of the ongoing financial 
turmoil, the sharp slowdown in the US and high 
commodity prices (for an assessment of the 
impact of high oil prices see model simulations 
presented in Box 1). The hard and soft data 
released since the publication of the latest interim 
forecast are consistent with these projections. 
The strong increase in food and energy prices has 
also led to an increase in the inflation forecast for 
2008 as a whole. Future markets predict that oil 
prices will remain high in 2008-09. If so, recent 
oil price developments, together with the lag 
structure of the oil price pass-through, imply that 
energy HICP inflation will remain elevated in 
2008. According to the Interim Forecast, 
consumer prices are projected to rise by 2.6% for 
the year as a whole, against 2.1% in the 2007 
Autumn Forecast. 
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2.  The Great Moderation in the euro 
area: what role have economic policies 
played? 
Most OECD countries have experienced a sharp 
reduction in both output growth volatility and 
inflation volatility over the past three decades. In 
policy terms, a key issue is whether this ‘Great 
Moderation’ reflects a long period of luck in the 
form of milder shocks and could therefore be 
reversed rapidly or whether it is attributable to 
changes in the structures and the policies of the 
economies concerned and could thus be of a 
more permanent nature. Although there is not 
yet any firm consensus, in the case of the US 
economy – on which most of the empirical 
research has focused so far – several prominent 
authors have ascribed the dominant role to the 
good luck hypothesis.4 This note builds on 
previous work presented in the Quarterly Report 
on the Euro Area and revisits, on the basis of an 
econometric panel analysis, the issue of what role 
changes in economic structures and policies have 
played in the great moderation.5  
Key stylised facts 
Over the past 30 years, the volatility of output 
has declined substantially in the euro area. When 
measured by the standard deviation of y-o-y 
GDP growth, it has dropped from over 2% in 
the 1970s to 1.1% in the most recent decade 
(1998Q1-2007Q3) (Graph 7). The decline was 
particularly pronounced in the late 1970s and 
early 1980s. It was brought to a temporary halt at 
the beginning of the 1990s but may have 
resumed its course in the 2000s.  
A look at a range of GDP data for the euro area 
suggests some stylised facts and provides some 
clues as to the possible drivers of the Great 
Moderation in the euro area. 
                                                     
4  See for instance:  
Stock, J. H., and M. W Watson (2003), 'Has the Business 
Cycle Changed? Evidence and Explanations', Federal 
Reserve Bank of Kansas City, pp. 9-56. 
Gordon, R. J. (2005), 'What Caused the Decline in U. S. 
Business Cycle Volatility?', NBER Working Papers 11777. 
5  See European Commission (2007), 'The reduced volatility 
of output growth in the euro area', Quarterly Report On 
the Euro Area, Vol. 6 No. 1; and European Commission 
(2007), 'The decline of inflation volatility in the euro area', 
Quarterly Report on the Euro Area, Vol. 6 No. 4. 
First, the decline in growth volatility has been 
broad-based, affecting to various degrees all 
GDP components and most industrial sectors. 
This seems to rule out explanations exclusively 
centred on one or a few segments of the 
economy. Nevertheless, volatility has decreased 
more sharply in the most volatile segments of the 
economy, notably inventories (when looking at 
the composition of demand) and manufacturing 
(when looking at industrial sectors). 
Graph 7: The volatility of GDP growth, euro area and 
US (standard deviation of y-o-y growth in % - 5 year 
window – 1975Q4-2007Q3) 
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Source: Commission services. 
Second, shifts in the composition of GDP have 
played only a modest role in the fall in growth 
volatility. The shares of GDP components have 
not changed sufficiently to affect noticeably the 
standard deviation of total growth. Shifts in the 
industrial structure, with the increasing 
importance of the most stable service sector, 
have been a more significant stabilisation force 
but this effect has remained rather limited.  
Third, the decomposition of GDP into its 
productivity and employment components 
indicates that the rise in output stability is 
attributable to lower volatility in productivity but 
not in employment. There has also been a 
decrease in the correlation between employment 
and productivity which could be an indication 
that changes in the functioning of the labour 
markets have helped to stabilise output. 
Fourth, the moderation of output growth 
volatility has been accompanied by a decline in 
the level and volatility of inflation, which 
suggests that changes in the conduct of monetary 
policy have played a critical part.  
Finally, while the Great Moderation is a feature 
common to most industrialised countries, the  
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magnitude and timing of the decline have 
differed substantially from one to another. This 
heterogeneity casts some doubts on explanations 
focusing exclusively on common shocks. 
Somehow, both changes in shocks and changes 
in economic policies and structures must have 
been at play.  
Graph 8 illustrates country differences in the 
magnitude of the Great Moderation. The graph 
displays estimates of inflation and output 
volatility in a number of OECD countries for the 
1970s (left panel) and the last ten years (right 
panel). Most countries now show a relatively 
similar performance in terms of growth and 
inflation volatility. In the 1970s, however, the 
range of performances was considerably larger. 
While most OECD countries have benefited 
from a drop in volatility over the past three 
decades, the drop has been comparatively much 
larger in countries which had very high volatility 
in the 1970s (e.g. EL, IT, NZ, PT, UK) than 
those where volatility was comparatively lower 
(e.g. DE, NL, US).  
Macroeconomic policies and output stability 
Changes in the conduct of macroeconomic 
policies over the pas three decades have been 
most visible in the area of monetary policy. The 
associated improvements in the efficiency of 
monetary policy are measurable against a broad 
range of indicators, including more counter-
cyclical interest rates, an increased stability of 
inflation expectations and an improved trade-off 
between output and inflation volatility. Graph 9, 
for instance, displays the first-order 
autocorrelation coefficient of inflation (based on 
the GDP deflator) for the 1970s and the most 
recent decade. The autocorrelation coefficient 
has dropped in most OECD countries pointing 
to a decrease in the persistence of inflation. 
Likely explanations include reduced inflation 
indexation and a shift from backward to forward 
looking inflation expectations in relation with a 
strengthening of the credibility of monetary 
policy. Interestingly, countries which have shown 
comparatively larger drops in the persistence of 
inflation have also tended to register larger falls 
in output volatility.  
Graph 9: Autocorrelation of inflation  
(first-order autocorrelation coefficient in %) (1)  
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(1) Inflation is calculated on the basis of the GDP deflator.  
Source: Commission services 
Evidence of the contribution of fiscal policy to 
the Great Moderation appears a priori more 
mixed. On the one hand, although the propensity 
to 'stop and go' has been considerably reduced, 
there are indications that discretionary fiscal 
policy retains pro-cyclical features in many 
OECD countries. On the other hand, empirical 
evidence points to a positive effect on output 
Graph 8:  Inflation and output growth volatility   
(standard deviation for the period in %) 
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stability of the rise in government size observed 
in many OECD countries in the 1970s and 
1980s, which could be an evidence of an increase 
in the smoothing power of automatic stabilisers.6  
Structural policies and output volatility 
Economic theory does not provide clear 
guidance as to the effects of product or labour 
market rigidities on output stability. Some forms 
of rigidities may dampen the initial impact of a 
shock but lengthen the ensuing adjustment phase 
with the net effect on output volatility remaining 
theoretically undetermined. The empirical 
literature on this subject is very limited, 
consisting – to the best of our knowledge – of a 
single study reporting a negative link between 
regulation and volatility.7  
Trade integration can affect output volatility via 
several, sometimes conflicting, channels. 
Increased trade integration means that a larger 
part of country-specific shocks are smoothed by 
being transferred to trading partners. However, 
trade integration may also foster production 
specialisation and therefore the occurrence of 
country-specific shocks. Empirical evidence for 
industrialised countries is relatively sparse and 
has so far failed to establish a significant link.8  
By improving opportunities to diversify and 
share risks, financial liberalisation allows better 
consumption smoothing and should thereby help 
curb output volatility. Nevertheless, financial 
liberalisation may also facilitate production 
specialisation and therefore increase the risk of 
sectoral shocks. Furthermore, historical evidence 
also shows that phases of financial liberalisation 
may be associated with temporary spells of 
                                                     
6  Fatás, A. and I. Mihov (2001), 'Government size and 
automatic stabilizers: international and intranational 
evidence', Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 
55(1), pages 3-28, October. 
7  Kent, C., K. Smith and J. Holloway (2005), 'Declining 
output volatility: What role for structural change?, RBA 
Research Discussion Papers, 2005-08.  
8  See Cecchetti, S. G., A. Flores-Lagunes and S. Krause 
(2006), 'Assessing the sources of changes in the volatility 
of real growth', NBER Working Papers 11946, National 
Bureau of Economic Research; 
Kent et al. (2005), op. cit.; 
Buch, C., J. Döpke. and C. Pierdzioch (2002), 'Financial 
openness and business cycle volatility', Kiel Working 
Papers 1121, Kiel Institute for the World Economy. 
increased volatility as economic agents take time 
to come to grips with the full implications of the 
new financial environment. The few studies 
which have explored the question empirically 
have generally reported a positive link between 
financial developments and output stability.9  
Results of a panel analysis 
This section provides some quantitative 
substance to the discussion of the previous 
section by summarising the results of an 
econometric analysis of the determinants of 
output, consumption and investment volatility in 
a panel of 20 OECD countries. The econometric 
work is presented in more detail in Box 2.  
One of the most critical findings of the 
regression work is that it brings support to the 
idea of a significant impact of macroeconomic 
policies on output volatility. Both monetary 
policy and fiscal policy – the latter via automatic 
stabilisers rather than discretionary policy – can 
help explain country differences in volatility 
developments over the past three decades.  
The regression results suggest that changes in 
monetary policy have contributed to the Great 
Moderation process in OECD countries. The 
estimated contribution is particularly large in 
some euro-area Member States (e.g. EL, ES, IT, 
PT, FI) where monetary policy mismanagement 
was particularly acute in the 1970s. In these 
countries monetary policy could account for as 
much as 25 to 40% of the drop in output 
volatility. In contrast, the contribution of 
monetary policy is found to be small in the US – 
in line with past research on that country – as 
well as in Germany. 
As regards budgetary policy, output growth 
volatility is found to be negatively correlated with 
the ratio of government expenditure to GDP, in 
line with results reported in Fatas and Mihov 
(2001). Provided that the size of government and 
the smoothing power of automatic stabilisers go 
hand in hand, this can be interpreted as evidence 
of a role of automatic stabilisers in the Great 
Moderation process. However, the relationship 
between government size and output stability 
                                                     
9  See for instance Cecchetti et al. (2006) and Buch, et al. 
(2002), op.cit.  
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appears to be non-linear. According to point 
estimates, the effect of government size on 
stability is positive up to a ratio of government 
expenditure to GDP of 50% and turns negative 
above this level.10 Overall, the contribution of 
government expenditure/automatic stabilisers to 
the drop in GDP volatility over the past three 
decades is found to be large only in few 
countries, mostly located in the euro area (e.g. 
EL, ES and PT). Finally, tests with a range of 
alternative public finance variables, including 
measures of the counter-cyclicality of 
discretionary fiscal policy, were unsuccessful. 
Hence, possible changes in the conduct of 
discretionary fiscal policy do not seem to have 
contributed sizeably to the rise in output stability.  
By providing a framework geared at 
macroeconomic stability, EMU has helped to 
stabilise growth in euro-area Member States. In 
the regressions, this EMU effect is mostly 
captured by the monetary policy variable and can 
be related to the comparatively large role played 
by changes in monetary policy in some Member 
States. The regressions provide only mixed 
evidence of a specific role of EMU in addition to 
what is already encapsulated in the monetary 
policy variable. Tests with various dummies for 
participation in EMU and/or ERM generally 
indicate a positive but non-significant additional 
effect of monetary integration on the stability of 
GDP growth. In contrast, there is some 
indication that participation in ERM and EMU is 
associated with reduced consumption and 
investment volatility although further work 
would be needed to reconcile these results with 
the lack of impact of the variable in the case of 
GDP volatility.  
The shift of production to services comes out 
as a significant regressor but the contribution of 
the variable to the fall in output volatility since 
the 1970s does not exceed 10-15% in those 
                                                     
10  Such a non-linear relation was first estimated empircally 
in Debrun, X., J. Pisani-Ferry and A. Sapir (2007), 
'Government size and output volatility: Should we forsake 
automatic stabilization?', Paper presented at the workshop 
'EMU@10: Achievements and challenges', DG ECFIN, 
November 2007. 
For a theoretical explanation of this non-linearity, see 
Buti, M., C. Martinez-Mongay, K. Sekkat and P. van den 
Noord (2003), 'Automatic fiscal stabilisers in EMU: a 
conflict between efficiency and stabilisation?', CESifo 
Economic Studies, Vol. 49, 1.  
countries where the shift has been the most 
pronounced (e.g. EL, FR, NL, UK and AU). The 
only exception is Germany, where the 
contribution reaches 30%. In contrast with most 
of the literature on this subject, openness to 
trade is found to be positively correlated with 
output volatility. But the effect is very small.  
Whereas conventional wisdom tends to give a 
prominent role to oil shocks in explanations of 
the high macroeconomic volatility of the 1970s 
and early 1980s, the hypothesis finds only mixed 
support in the panel regressions. Its effect is not 
statistically significant in the case of GDP 
volatility but it emerges as an important 
explanatory variable for the volatility of 
consumption growth. Thus, swings in oil prices 
could be a key source of consumption volatility 
while their impact on GDP volatility is limited as 
it depends on a range of other factors such as the 
credibility of monetary policy.  
More stringent product market regulations are 
associated with lower output growth volatility. 
The result should however be considered with 
prudence as it appears statistically less robust 
than that for the macroeconomic policy 
variables. In addition the indicator of product 
market regulation used in the regression covers 
only some service sectors.  
Likewise, results on financial liberalisation are 
mixed. The variable is not a statistically 
significant explanatory variable of GDP or 
consumption volatility but stands as a meaningful 
regressor in the case of investment. This could be 
an indication that financial liberalisation has so 
far contributed more to smooth investment than 
consumption or GDP. Nevertheless, caution is 
warranted as the proxy used for financial 
liberalisation is not very satisfying although 
widely used in the empirical literature.  
Overall, the variables included in the regressions 
explain about 50% of the decline in output 
volatility since the 1970s, the rest being 
accounted for by time-fixed effects.11 Most of the 
share is attributable to macroeconomic policy 
variables with monetary policy playing a leading 
role. The explanatory power of the model is 
somewhat higher for the euro area – particularly 
                                                     
11  In panel regression, fixed time effects capture effects 
which are common to all countries and are not captured 
by the explanatory variables.  
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Box 2: Quantifying the sources of the decline in output growth volatility  
This box presents the results of a panel data exercise aimed at quantifying the possible contributions of a number of 
determinants to the decline in output volatility in OECD countries. Output growth volatility is regressed on a range 
of variables, including both structural and economic policy indicators. As regards structural changes, the main 
variables tested are: (i) the sectoral shift in production towards services (measured by the share of value added in the 
service sector in total value added); (ii) the degree of openness to international trade and (iii) changes in the exposure 
to oil prices. Economic policy variables include measures of changes in macroeconomic policies, both (iii) monetary 
policy and (iv) fiscal policy, as well as indicators aimed at capturing changes in structural policies in terms of 
(v) financial markets and (vi) regulation in the product markets. 
The regression is estimated on a panel of 20 countries (the former EU15 Member States – except LU – US, JP, CA, 
AU, CH and NZ) with time- and country-fixed effects added when statistically appropriate. The analysis is carried 
out for the period 1973-2007 broken down into 7 sub-periods of 5 years each (1973Q1-1977Q4, 1978Q1-1982Q4, 
etc.). Volatility is measured as the standard deviation of year-on-year quarterly changes in the variable considered. 
Regression results are presented in the table below. The endogenous variable is the volatility of, respectively, GDP 
growth (Col. 1 and 2), consumption growth (Col. 3) and investment growth (Col. 4). All equations are estimated with 
time effects but country-fixed effects are found to be jointly non-significant in the case of the main specification 
(Col. 1), which is therefore estimated without them. Nevertheless, given that the test of statistical significance of the 
country-fixed effects does not point to a strong rejection of these effects, the equation obtained with country-fixed 
effects is also shown (Column 2) to allow to check the sensitivity of the results to the inclusion of country effects.  
 
The sources of growth volatility – Results of a panel regression  
 
Endogenous variable: GDP volatility  
(no country FE)   
GDP volatility  
(with country FE)  
Consumption volatility Investment 
volatility 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Monetary policy variable 0.008 *** 0.007 *** 0.009 **  
Gov. expenditures -0.200 *** -0.138 **   
(Gov. expenditures) ^2 0.002 *** 0.001 *   
Share of services in VA -0.025 ** -0.046 *   
World trade volatility x trade openness  0.040 **    
Participation in ERM / EMU   -0.630 * -1.901 * 
Ratio of private sector credit to GDP    -0.022 * 
Index of product market regulation  -0.341 ***   
Energy intensity x oil price volatility   8.511 **  
Country fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes 
Period fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations. 125 125 113 121 
Notes – Estimation method: panel OLS regressions. ***, **, * denote, respectively, statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10% level (based on White 
robust estimates of standard deviations). 
The regressions include two dummies to cater for, respectively, the high level of growth volatility generally registered in Greece (only Col. 1) and 
the extreme volatility brought by the recession of the early 1990s in Finland (Col. (1) to (4)).  
 
The monetary policy variable is calculated as the distance between the real interest rate gap (i.e. the actual real 
short-term interest rate minus the equilibrium real interest rate) and a weighted sum of deviations of inflation and 
GDP from their respective trends. A high level of the variable suggests that the level of the real rate is not in line 
with developments in inflation and the output gap. Regression results show a positive and significant effect of the 
variable on volatility, i.e. inadequate interest rates are associated with higher output volatility. The contribution of the 
monetary policy variable to growth volatility was particularly high in the 1970s and early 1980s in some countries 
(EL, ES, IT, PT, FI) pointing to inadequate monetary policies in those countries for that period. Tests with various 
dummies for participation in EMU and/or ERM generally indicate a positive but non-significant effect of 
monetary integration on the stability of GDP growth (this is in addition to the EMU effect already captured in the 
monetary policy variable). In contrast, participation in ERM and EMU – as captured by a dummy variable with a 
value of 1 in case of participation in either ERM or EMU – is associated with reduced consumption and investment 
volatility and the size of the estimated effect is far from negligible. However, even in the case of consumption and 
investment, there is no evidence that EMU has played a stronger role than ERM.  
Turning to fiscal policy, the indicator measuring the degree of fiscal activism (i.e. the correlation of the CAPB with 
the output gap) comes out as non-significant. In contrast, an increase in the size of government expenditure is 
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significantly associated with lower output volatility, suggesting a positive relationship between government size and 
the smoothing power of automatic stabilisers. The relationship appears, however, to be strongly non-linear. A test 
with a quadratic term points to a threshold for the share of government expenditure in GDP of about 50% (with a 
likely range of about 46% to 54% given estimated standard deviations). Above this threshold, an increase in 
government size is associated with an increase in GDP growth volatility.  The threshold is slightly lower in the 
second specification in Column (2) (at 47%). 
Looking at the coefficients of the variables capturing structural changes, the services indicator comes out 
significant and negative. However, the effect remains small: point estimates suggest that a 10% increase in the share 
of services in GDP results in a 0.3 percentage point decline in output growth volatility. Trade openness displays a 
positive but small sign. A country with a higher degree of openness faces higher output volatility but the effect is 
marginal. The coefficient on the oil intensity variable has the expected sign (i.e. an increase in oil intensity leads to 
higher output volatility in periods of swings in oil prices) but is not statistically significant in the case of GDP 
volatility. It only becomes meaningful in the consumption equation.  
Finally, the two variables aimed at capturing changes in structural policies, i.e. the ratio of private-sector credit to 
GDP and the indicator of product market regulations, are both found to be statistically insignificant in the main 
regression (Column 1). There is, however, some evidence that increased financial developments have played a role 
in the reduction of investment growth volatility but the investment regression is not very robust statistically and the 
result should be viewed with caution. The index of product market regulation (PMR) is found to be negatively 
associated with GDP volatility (i.e. more regulations reduce volatility) but only in the specification which includes 
country-fixed effects. Furthermore, the PMR index (compiled by the OECD) only covers services. Again the result 
should be considered with considerable prudence and deserves further exploration. 
 
southern Member States – than for the rest of 
the OECD, and is rather weak for the US.  
Finally, it is worth stressing that estimation 
results suggest that it is difficult to interpret time 
effects purely in terms of shocks (good luck 
hypothesis). The estimated time effects show a 
clear and steady downward trend which suggests 
that they capture both common shocks and some 
missing explanatory variable. An obvious 
potential candidate for the latter would be the 
improvement in the management of inventories. 
There is indeed some correlation between the 
estimated time effects and the reduction of the 
contribution of inventories to GDP volatility as 
computed on the basis of the GDP accounting 
identity. Another potential candidate is financial 
market development which, due to lack of 
proper data, has only been crudely captured in 
the estimations. 
Conclusion 
Expanding on past Commission work on this 
issue, this section has looked into several drivers 
of the Great Moderation in OECD countries. 
Panel econometric analysis points to a significant 
role for changes in macroeconomic policies, 
particularly through more credible monetary 
policy but also possibly through an increasing 
smoothing power of automatic stabilisers. It also 
indicates that changes in economic structures 
such as the rising weight of services in 
production, increased trade openness and 
reduced oil exposure have made little or no 
contribution.  
An attempt to quantify the possible impact of the 
liberalisation of financial and product markets 
leads to mixed results. There is some evidence 
that product market liberalisation is associated 
with lower output stability while financial 
liberalisation helps enhance investment stability. 
These two results seem, however, somewhat less 
statistically robust than those listed above, 
something which may be explained by the low 
quality of the indicators used.  
For the sample of OECD countries considered, 
the explanatory variables used in the study can 
account for about 50% (or slightly more in the 
case of the euro area) of the drop in output 
growth volatility since the 1970s, the rest being 
broadly captured by a fixed time effect. This 
means that at least 50% of the drop in volatility is 
rooted in structural and policy changes and 
therefore unlikely to be unwound quickly. The 
share is actually an underestimation as the steady 
pattern of the time effects suggests that some 
explanatory variables are either missing – e.g. 
better inventory management – or poorly 
captured by the indicators used. 
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 3. Recent labour market reforms in the 
euro area: characteristics and 
estimated impact 
The recorded pace of structural reforms since the 
introduction of the euro has been somewhat 
mixed.12 The advent of the third stage of EMU 
did not coincide with an acceleration of labour 
market reforms but with a continuation of 
reform strategy characterised by incremental 
reforms (i.e. a sequence of small changes), 
broadly heading towards better labour market 
adjustment capacity. A more in-depth analysis of 
labour market reforms enacted under the euro 
can be conducted using the LABREF database.13 
This section describes the reforms enacted in the 
euro area in various areas. Based on the 
chronology of reforms, it explores the effect of 
certain policy measures taken for groups with 
low labour market attachment on the average 
employment and participation rates and their 
response over the cycle. 
Labour market reforms enacted in the euro 
area 
The structure of LABREF can be used to analyse 
the distribution of measures enacted between 
2000 and 2006 by areas of policy intervention 
(Graph 10) and design characteristics (Graph 11). 
For the euro area as a whole, the majority of 
measures have been in the area of active labour 
market policies, taxation, unemployment and 
welfare-related benefits and pensions (Graph 10). 
Compared to the recently-acceded Member 
States, relatively few initiatives have been taken 
in the euro area in the area of employment 
protection legislation. About 15% of all reforms 
enacted in the euro area were in the area of 
pensions. As shown in Graph 11, a large number 
                                                     
12  A review of different arguments in support of (or against) a 
change in the pace of structural reforms after the euro and some 
recent evidence can be found in QREA 2007 (Vol. 6 No 4).  
13  LABREF is an inventory of labour market reforms jointly 
managed by DG ECFIN and the Economic Policy Committee. 
It is a tool that provides a comprehensive description of 
qualitative features of the reform process, including the design of 
enacted reforms, their scope and durability. To date, the database 
covers the years 2000-2006 for the EU-27. Information for the 
year 2007 will be made available to the public in April 2008. The 
database can be freely accessed at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/db_indicators/db_indica
tors8638_en.htm.  
For a description of LABREF, see European Economy Research 
Letter Vol. 1, Issue 3, November 2007. 
of policy measures targeted specific groups, with 
no major differences between euro-area and non-
euro-area countries. Finally, labour supply has 
been the main focus of policy intervention in a 
large number of countries. This reflects the 
prevalence of measures in the field of welfare 
benefits and pensions.  
Graph 10: Distribution of labour market reforms by 
reform area 
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Graph 11: Distribution of labour market reforms by 
reform characteristics  
(in % of total reforms – 2000-2006) 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
Targeted
(1) 
Embedded
(2)
Matching
(3)
Wages Labour
supply 
Labour
demand
Euro area 15
New Members States (excl. BG & RO)
UK, SE and DK
 
(1) Reforms targeting specific socio-economic groups.  
(2) Reforms embedded in a formal long-term policy programme.  
(3) Reforms aimed at a better match of the unemployed and 
vacancies. 
Source: LABREF 
Table 4 provides a synopsis of policy measures in 
different areas, based on the information 
available form the LABREF database for the 
years 2000 to 2006. Overall, there is a certain 
convergence between the measures enacted in 
the euro area. Several countries have eased the 
access to part-time and temporary forms of 
work. More flexible employment contracts may 
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have made a positive contribution to the increase 
in labour utilisation, especially among groups 
with low participation rates, and enhanced the 
reallocation of labour.  
Wage moderation has been observed since the 
launch of EMU. While this may have contributed 
to the improvements in the labour market trends 
registered so far, less clear is whether it has also 
made for a better response to country- and 
sector-specific shocks. In some countries, wage 
moderation has resulted from collectively agreed 
derogations to national contracts rather than 
from centrally-agreed income policies. This is 
particularly the case of Germany, where industry-
level and company-level collective agreements 
negotiated in the early 2000s paved the way for 
the introduction of long-term working time 
accounts and for a wide range of opening clauses, 
which allowed companies to deviate from 
collectively agreed standards. Similar agreements, 
leading to de facto decentralisation of wage 
bargaining, have also been registered to various 
degrees in Austria, the Netherlands, Spain and 
France.  
Conversely, proper reforms of bargaining 
structures to make wage settlements respond 
more to productivity gains at local and company 
level have been rare. More precise criteria to 
determine the general validity of collective 
agreements have been defined in Finland and 
France. In the latter country, the possibility was 
introduced at company level of departing from 
sector-level agreements. Changes in the collective 
bargaining procedure were also introduced in 
Portugal (2003), to enhance the responsiveness 
of wage settings to productivity and skill 
differentials across sectors. Some elements of 
flexibility have been introduced in the central 
income agreements in Spain and Slovenia to take 
account of productivity gains and local 
conditions on top of inflation.  
Higher flexibility of working time 
organisation, either to reconcile work and 
family life or to adjust employees' working 
patterns more to the company's changing needs, 
has been observed in most euro-area countries. 
Measures in this field were either in support of 
labour supply – e.g. working parents (ES, AT), 
older workers (BE, DE, FR and AT) – or were 
intended to inject greater margins of flexibility 
into overtime schemes (EL, FR) and into 
working time arrangements (AT). 
 Table 4: Structural reforms in euro-area labour markets, 2006-2007  
Policy area  Main developments in the euro area as a whole 
Active labour market 
policies 
• Gradual shift from passive to active policies 
• Shift towards more effective job search and early activation 
• More focus on target groups 
• Improved governance of public employment services (PES) and closer complementarities/ 
streamlining of PES activities with welfare benefit providers 
Welfare benefits • Reducing the generosity and duration of unemployment benefits  
• Tightening eligibility and availability to work criteria and reinforcing sanction mechanisms 
• Increased use of in-work benefits to improve the work attachment of marginal workers 
• Increased attention to family-related policies, including child-care support 
EPL • Mainly increasing flexibility at the margin of the labour market with potentially detrimental 
segmentation effects 
Taxation • Cuts in labour taxes targeting low-income levels to reduce inactivity and unemployment traps for 
low-income earners 
• Reductions in social security contributions to boost labour demand, often targeting difficult to 
employ groups and older workers 
Pensions  • Little focus on reforms of early retirement, sickness and disability  
• Some parametric reforms of pension systems and very few structural reforms, but substantial 
reform programmes (sometimes with gradual and long phasing-in) have been adopted in a 
number of Member States in previous years 
Wage bargaining  • Few efforts, mainly in Belgium, Germany and Spain, to make wages more responsive to sectoral 
and local cyclical conditions 
Working time  • Introduction of innovative working time arrangements, both to reconcile work and family life 
and to promote more flexible organisation of work at company level 
Immigration and 
mobility 
• Some measures to improve the integration of third-country nationals, to simplify the procedures 
for entry and regularisation or to develop a flexible employment permit system focusing on the 
economy’s skills and labour needs.   
Source: Commission services – Labour Marker Reform database (LABREF) 
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Reforms of the tax and benefit systems allow 
time to be reallocated between market and non-
market activities and labour supply to be 
sustained. Intervention in the benefit systems 
was inspired by the principle that the threat of 
losing benefits if a job offer is not accepted 
increases the incentive to search for a job. Thus, 
they have combined a lower level and shorter 
duration of benefits with tight availability-for-
work criteria and more systematic controls and 
effective application of sanctions for refusal of 
suitable job offers. These measures were often 
supported by tax cuts, mainly targeting low 
incomes, and by more rigorous activation 
policies. Reforms have entailed, for instance, a 
sharp cut in the unemployment benefit 
maximum duration (NL) or substantial cuts in 
benefits (DE).  
Some reforms of the tax systems were based on 
the idea that higher taxes and the withdrawal of 
means-tested benefits when income rises can be 
detrimental as to the decision to work longer 
hours and shift from part-time to full-time. 
Reductions in the marginal effective tax rate, at 
least for some family types at low to medium 
wage levels, have been obtained in Spain, France, 
Ireland, the Netherlands, Austria and Portugal. 
Reductions in the tax wedge have been adopted 
in Germany, Portugal, Austria and Ireland. In 
addition, cutting the tax wedge on labour has 
been a frequently used instrument to stimulate 
labour demand in the euro area. Targeted cuts in 
employers’ social security contributions have 
been introduced, usually on a short-term basis, to 
create incentives to hire those with the lowest 
probability of joining the labour market. Non-
targeted reductions of employers' social security 
contributions were extensively used in Italy (to 
foster employment in regions with high 
unemployment rates) and in Spain (in case of 
conversion of fixed-term contracts into 
permanent ones). Substantial simplifications of 
the rebates of employers' social security 
contributions in favour of the lowest wage levels 
have been introduced in France and in Belgium.  
In contrast, reforms of job protection 
legislation have been limited and piecemeal, 
mainly targeting flexibility for new entrants and 
marginal workers, while leaving the legislation on 
permanent employment unchanged. Finding a 
viable balance between flexibility and security 
also proved to be difficult on account of the 
complex interactions between institutions and 
the political sensitivity of the subject. As a 
significant exception to this general trend, 
important changes to job protection regulation 
were introduced in Slovenia in 2007. The lack of 
action observed in the field of employment 
protection legislation (EPL) seemed also to go 
together with substantial inactivity in the area of 
unemployment insurance in euro-area countries - 
such as Greece, Italy and Portugal - which have 
the most rigid EPL for open-ended contracts and 
the lowest level of protection in the market.14 
Table 5: Contribution of temporary and 
permanent employment to total average annual 
employment growth (1) 
 1991-1998 1999-2006 
Temporary employment (in pp) 
Euro area 4.1 3.3 
UK, SE and DK 2.9 -0.4 
Permanent employment (in pp) 
Euro area 4.7 7.2 
UK, SE and DK 10.8 5.4 
(1) The sum of the contributions of temporary and permanent 
employment for each group of countries gives the cumulated 
average employment growth over each sub-period based on the 
LFS. This can differ from the growth rate based on National 
Accounts. 
Source: Commission services – Labour Force Survey. 
 
As shown in Table 5, euro-area countries 
experienced a sizeable increase in employment 
after 1998, which took the form of both 
permanent and temporary work positions. 
Conversely, non-euro-area countries experienced 
an increase in employment only thanks to the 
increase in permanent employment. This 
different pattern is likely to have resulted from 
the ease of employment protection legislation for 
workers with a temporary contract and may be 
held responsible for an increasing labour market 
                                                     
14  From the point of view of risk-averse individuals, job 
security provided by employment protection is 
functionally equivalent to a system of unemployment 
benefits, which explains why countries with strict 
employment protection legislation have relatively low 
unemployment benefits and vice versa. However, an 
efficient system of unemployment benefits stabilises the 
expected incomes of risk-averse individuals, and may also 
induce workers to accept more employment flexibility. A 
better reallocation of labour could be achieved through 
reforms of the labour market and the welfare state that, in 
line with the  flexicurity approach, shift the focus from 
protection of workers in the same job for their entire 
lifetime to protection of workers in the market.  
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dualism in some euro-area countries. Reducing 
this dualism is one of the priorities of the policy 
agenda. In France, a new type of open-ended 
employment contract was introduced in 2005 for 
new recruits in firms of up to 20 employees, 
making for a longer probation period. Efforts to 
narrow the gap between standard and flexible 
employment contracts have also been made in 
Spain and Finland.  
Under the pressure of ageing and persistently low 
participation rates of older workers, many 
countries have implemented pension reforms. 
More often than not, these reforms established a 
stronger actuarial link between contributions and 
benefits and increased incentives for workers to 
retire later. In a large number of countries (e.g. 
DE, ES, CY, PT and FI), reforms usually 
involved the introduction of changes in the 
eligibility conditions for first pillar old-age 
benefits, either by increasing the statutory 
retirement age, or by introducing stricter 
eligibility conditions other than age, or both. 
Other measures included changes in the 
contribution rates and shares among employers 
and employees, in the tax regime of contributions 
and pension benefits, and in pension coverage, 
and setting up and developing mandatory and/or 
voluntary second- and third-tier pension 
schemes. Efforts to increase the flexibility in 
their pension systems have been made in Spain 
and Finland. 
Incentives to early retirement have been 
reduced. Conditions for eligibility for early 
retirement and disability have been tightened. In 
many Member States, early retirement schemes 
have been abolished altogether. The possibility 
and incentives to work beyond the normal 
retirement age or to combine state/occupational 
pensions with pension contributions completed 
after entitlement have been introduced or 
expanded in most countries (notably, BE, ES, FR 
and IT).  
Many of the measures enacted in recent years 
have been geared to activating socio-economic 
groups with low labour market attachment, 
namely low-skilled, women and older workers. 
This focus is captured by the high proportion of 
reforms targeting specific socio-economic groups 
(Graph 11). Thus, the policy emphasis on these 
groups may have contributed to the increase in 
the participation and employment rates of the 
recent years, a hypothesis that is confirmed in the 
next section. 
Effect of reforms targeting marginally 
attached groups on employment rates 
Box 3 presents an econometric analysis of the 
impact of reforms targeting marginally attached 
socio-economic groups (i.e. low-skilled, women 
and older workers) on the overall employment 
and participation rates. The reforms covered in 
this econometric exercise include measures 
involving: a change in the regulatory framework 
or fiscal incentives for temporary and part-time 
work; tax cuts for low-skilled/low-income 
workers; the use of employment subsidies and 
direct job creation schemes; and the introduction 
of in-work benefits. Overall, the econometric 
results show that these measures have paid off.  
Estimation results indicate that the response of 
the employment rate to cyclical fluctuations in 
GDP, especially for men, is higher for countries 
outside the euro area than for those inside. The 
difference seems to relate primarily to 
employment demand rather than to employment 
supply and is consistent with euro-area countries 
being relatively more rigid in terms of 
employment.  
Results also show that countries that have made 
an effort to activate groups at the margin of the 
labour market have enjoyed stronger gains in 
terms of employment rates. Euro-area Member 
States seem to 'gain' about twice as much from 
reforms as countries in the non-euro-area group. 
This result holds predominantly, but not 
exclusively, for men. It confirms that reforms 
targeting marginally attached groups have been 
more firmly geared to raising their employment 
rates in the euro area than in the rest of the EU.  
The estimations also provide some indication 
that reforms that have improved the level of 
employment have also promoted adjustment to 
shocks in the form of a stronger response of the 
employment rate to cyclical fluctuations in 
activity. This effect, however, only seems to be in 
evidence in the euro area and for female workers. 
The same econometric approach has also been 
used to assess whether reforms for groups at the  
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Box 3 : Estimating the impact of reforms targeting marginally attached workers 
The chronology of reforms provided in LABREF is used to assess the quantitative effect of reforms targeting 
marginally attached workers on the total employment (or participation) rates. To this end, developments in the total 
employment (or participation) rates in those countries that have put in place reforms are compared with 
developments in employment (or participation) rates in non-reforming countries. Only reforms targeting marginally 
attached workers are considered (i.e. at women, older workers and low-skilled workers).  
 
The following equation is estimated:  
tititititiiti reformsgdpgdpreformsn ,2,1,1,1,,  * εδµβα +∆+∆++=∆ −−−−  
where: 
 ,tin  employment rate;  
 ,tigdp gross domestic product;  
 iα country-specific fixed effect;   
tireforms , =1 if a reform targeting marginally attached workers is occurring in country i at time t and 0 otherwise.  
This formulation allows to test whether employment and its cyclical response change after the reforms. The 
coefficients β and δ capture the differential effects of reforms on the employment rate and its cyclical response 
respectively. If β≠0, reforms influence the average employment rate. If δ≠0, reforms also affect its response over the 
cycle. To capture the lagged effect of reforms, the reform dummy is introduced with a 2-year lag.  
This equation is estimated for total, female and male employment rates respectively, both for euro-area countries and 
for the rest of the EU-25 over the period 2001-2006 (see first table below). The equation is also estimated for total, 
female and male participation rates for the same groups of countries and time periods (see second table below).  
Effect of reforms on total, female and male employment rates, euro area and rest of EU-25  
Dependent variable:  change in employment rate 
Total  Female  Male   
Euro-area 
countries 
Rest of EU-
25 
Euro-area 
countries 
Rest of EU-
25 
Euro-area 
countries 
Rest of EU-25
Reforms dummy (-1) 0.64*** 
(2.66) 
0.24*** 
(7.27) 
0.46*** 
(2.04) 
0.23*** 
(3.86) 
0.77*** 
(2.62) 
0.12 
(0.72) 
GDP growth (-1) 0.11** 
(1.96) 
0.15*** 
(4.30) 
0.07 
(1.50) 
0.12*** 
(2.98) 
0.10*** 
(2.07) 
0.29*** 
(7.56) 
GDP growth (-1)*Reforms dummy 
(-2) 
0.06 
(1.20) 
0.009 
(0.56) 
0.11** 
(2.18) 
0.025 
(1.28) 
0.001 
(0.02) 
0.02 
(0.02) 
Country fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  72 78 72 78 72 78 
R-squared (adjusted) 0.33 0.48 0.40 0.27 0.21 0.36 
OLS regression controlling for country-specific heteroskedasticity and contemporaneous correlation.  Absolute values of T-statistics in 
parentheses; *significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.. Estimation period: 2001-2006. 
  
Effect of reforms on total, female and male participation rates, euro area and rest of EU-25 
Dependent variable: change in participation rate  
Total  Female  Male   
Euro-area 
countries 
Rest of EU-
25 
Euro-area 
countries 
Rest of EU-25 Euro-area 
countries 
Rest of EU-
25 
Reforms dummy (-1) 0.41*** 
(5.01) 
0.014 
(0.12) 
0.29*** 
(4.41) 
-0.06 
(-0.61) 
-0.13 
(-0.99) 
-0.0013 
(-0.03) 
GDP growth (-1) -0.02 
(-0.74) 
0.13*** 
(4.72) 
-0.03 
(-1.10) 
0.06 
(1.33) 
-0.02 
(-0.66) 
-0.06*** 
(-4.05) 
GDP growth (-1)*Reforms dummy 
(-2) 
0.10** 
(2.12) 
-0.007 
(-0.40) 
0.16** 
(2.93) 
0.02 
(1.04) 
-0.02 
(-0.40) 
0.024 
(1.11) 
Country fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Observations  72 78 72 78 72 78 
R-squared (adjusted) 0.19 0.29 0.19 0.27 0.02 0.12 
OLS regression controlling for country-specific heteroskedasticity and contemporaneous correlation.  Absolute values of T-statistics in 
parentheses; *significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Estimation period: 2001-2006. 
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margin of the labour market have effectively had 
the effect of changing the pattern of participation 
rates. Various specifications for the participation 
rate equation for euro area and non-euro-area 
countries suggest that these reforms have been 
paying off more in the euro area than in non-
euro-area countries.  
Conclusions 
The information available from the LABREF 
database suggests that the reforms put in place in 
the euro area have mainly been targeted at 
increasing labour utilisation, especially among 
groups with low participation rates (the 
outsiders). In addition, the reforms enacted to 
improve labour market flexibility focused mainly 
on the same outsiders, while only minor policy 
intervention was geared to the needs of adapting 
employment regulation for insiders.  
Econometric analysis indicates that this 
configuration of reforms has paid off in terms of 
increasing employment rates and participation 
rates in the euro area. It has also entailed a 
strengthening of the response of employment to 
cyclical fluctuations. However, data also point to 
the increasingly dual nature of euro-area labour 
markets, with reforms targeting the margins of 
the labour market rather than standard labour 
contracts. As advocated in the Commission 
Communication on Flexicurity,15 this increased 
dualism may require further measures, with 
revision both of the labour regulation for 
standard contracts and of unemployment 
benefits and activation systems. 
                                                     
15  Communication from the Commission to the European 
Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and 
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions 
'Towards common principles of flexicurity: More and 
better jobs through flexibility and security', SEC 
2007(861) (862) 27/06/2007. 
4.  Member States' differences in the 
transmission of recent inflation shocks 
Headline inflation in the euro area picked up 
significantly in the course of 2007, and inflation 
tensions are persisting at the beginning of this 
year. Higher energy and food prices have been 
important drivers in that respect, whereas the 
appreciation of the euro has worked in the 
opposite direction. This section looks into recent 
inflation developments in euro-area Member 
States and reviews country differences in the 
transmission of recent inflation shocks. 
Inflation developments in euro-area Member 
States 
Over the last six months, i.e. in the period 
between July 2007 and January 2008, annual 
HICP inflation increased by 1.4 pp in the euro 
area. In nine euro-area Member States (Austria, 
Belgium, Cyprus, Finland, France, Greece, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Malta, Slovenia and Spain), it 
increased by more than 1 pp, whereas upward 
movements in other countries were more muted. 
In January 2008, the highest inflation rates were 
observed in Slovenia (6.4%), Spain (4.4%), 
Luxembourg (4.2%) and Greece (3.9%). 
Graph 12: Headline inflation dispersion in the euro area 
(in % – Jan 1999 to Jan 2008) 
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(1) Monthly unweighted standard deviation across the euro area  
Source: Commission services. 
Inflation dispersion, measured by either the 
standard deviation or the range between the 
lowest and the highest inflation rates across euro-
area Member States, fell slightly between late 
2005 and early 2007, before rebounding towards 
spring 2007. For example, the range has more 
than doubled recently, increasing from a low of 
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1.6 pp in April 2007 to 4.6 pp in January 2008 
(see Graph 12). This can to a large extent be 
attributed to a significant increase in inflation in 
Slovenia (to 6.4% in January 2008). Excluding 
Slovenia, the range increased more moderately, 
from a low of 1.5 pp in May 2007 to 2.6 pp in 
January 2008. 
Table 6 shows the contributions to headline 
inflation in 2007 of the five main HICP 
consumption segments, both at aggregate euro-
area and at Member State level. The acceleration 
of headline HICP inflation between the first and 
the fourth quarter of the year generally reflected 
increased contributions from energy and 
processed food. However, the extent to which 
the global price shocks were transmitted to 
individual euro-area Member States varied 
significantly. 
Energy inflation and oil prices 
One of the main factors affecting recent euro-
area inflation developments has been the large 
rise in energy inflation, mainly caused by an 
increase in oil prices over the last year. Euro-
denominated oil prices have increased by around 
54% over the past twelve months, reaching 63 
euros per barrel in January 2008 (in dollar terms 
the increase was 72%). Amongst euro-area 
Member States, the highest contribution of 
energy inflation to the increase in headline HICP 
in 2007 was recorded in Germany, Ireland, the 
Netherlands and Slovenia. The impact was null in 
Belgium and even negative in Malta.  
One reason for these differences is the unequal 
energy weights in HICP baskets, particularly in 
Slovenia (3.2 pp higher than the euro-area 
average) and Germany (1.6 pp), where energy 
weights in the HICP baskets are higher than the 
euro-area average (see Table 7). In Malta, Greece 
and Finland, on the other hand, energy weights 
in the HICP baskets are much lower than the 
average. These differences imply that a given rise 
in energy prices will have a different impact on 
headline inflation in different countries. For 
instance, an increase of energy prices of 10% in 
Slovenia and Greece will entail a pick-up of 
headline inflation that will be 0.6 pp higher in the 
former country.  
Another reason for the differentiated impact of 
oil prices on energy inflation is developments in 
administered prices. In Germany and Slovenia, 
for instance, administered prices on electricity 
and liquid fuels increased in 2007. In most other 
Member States, administered prices decreased. 
Table 6: Sectoral contribution to inflation in euro-area Member States in 2007 
(annual change in % – period averages) 
Non-energy 
industrial goods 
Energy Unprocessed 
food 
Processed 
food 
Services All-items HICP 
2007 2007 2007 2007 2007 2007 2008 
 Q1 Q4 Q1 Q4 Q1 Q4 Q1 Q4 Q1 Q4 Q1 Q4 Jan-08 
Belgium 0.3 0.3 -0.1 0.8 0.4 0.2 0.4 0.8 0.8 0.6 1.8 2.7 3.5 
Germany 0.4 0.4 0.3 1.0 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.8 1.0 1.9 3.0 2.9 
Ireland -0.3 -0.4 0.3 0.8 0.2 0.1 0.4 0.9 2.3 1.8 2.8 3.2 3.1 
Greece 0.8 0.5 -0.2 1.0 0.1 0.2 0.7 0.5 1.6 1.4 2.9 3.6 3.9 
Spain 0.3 0.1 -0.1 0.9 0.5 0.5 0.4 1.0 1.4 1.4 2.5 4.0 4.4 
France 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.8 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.3 1.0 1.0 1.3 2.5 3.2 
Italy 0.5 0.5 0.2 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.8 0.8 2.0 2.6 3.1 
Cyprus -0.5 -0.1 -0.3 1.4 0.8 0.0 0.3 0.5 1.1 1.4 1.3 3.2 4.1 
Luxembourg 0.5 0.5 0.0 1.4 0.2 0.1 0.7 1.1 0.9 0.9 2.2 4.0 4.2 
Malta 0.1 0.6 -0.3 0.1 0.1 0.6 0.3 0.6 0.7 0.6 0.8 2.5 3.8 
Netherlands 0.2 0.0 0.3 0.6 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.4 0.7 0.6 1.5 1.7 1.8 
Austria 0.1 0.6 0.1 0.9 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.6 1.1 0.7 1.8 3.2 3.1 
Portugal 0.6 0.2 0.2 0.8 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.6 1.0 1.1 2.4 2.7 2.9 
Slovenia 0.0 0.3 0.1 1.1 0.4 0.8 0.5 1.5 1.6 1.8 2.6 5.5 6.4 
Finland -0.2 -0.3 0.0 0.6 0.3 0.3 0.1 0.2 1.2 1.2 1.4 2.0 3.5 
Euro area 0.3 0.3 0.1 0.8 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.5 0.9 1.0 1.8 2.9 3.2 
Source: Commission services. 
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Box 4: The direct effect of changes in oil prices on euro-area HICP inflation 
 
Changes in oil prices impact on inflation through a number of channels. Firstly, inflation is directly affected by the 
impact on the HICP energy component. Secondly, there is an indirect effect on inflation as energy price changes are 
passed on to other sectors of the economy, such as the transport sector. Finally, inflation can be affected if these 
direct and indirect impacts then lead to second-round effects, i.e. if wages increase in response to higher inflation, in 
turn putting upward pressure on inflation. 
This box analyses the size and the speed of oil price pass-through via the first of these channels in the euro area and 
in Germany, Spain, France and Italy. Q-o-q percentage changes of the HICP energy category are regressed on level 
changes in the euro-denominated Brent oil price and a number of its lags. The results of these estimations are 
reported in the table below. 
 
Estimated pass-through of oil prices into the HICP 
 Energy HICP Gas HICP 
 
Euro 
area Germany Spain France Italy 
Euro 
area Germany Spain France Italy 
Constant 0.47 0.66 0.26 0.13 0.15 0.53 0.69  0.34 0.21 
 (2.68) (2.68) (1.04) (0.56) (0.86) (2.65) (1.83)  (0.96) (1.01)
Oil price 0.50 0.50 0.66 0.52 0.32      
 (12.60) (8.94) (11.5) (9.59) (8.35)      
Oil price Q-1    0.13 0.18 0.09   0.26 0.11 
    (2.28) (4.53) (1.85)   (3.11) (2.34)
Oil price Q-2     0.09 0.37 0.50   0.37 
     (2.19) (7.86) (5.53)   (7.56)
Oil price Q-3 0.12 0.18 0.11 0.10 0.08 0.29 0.37  0.43 0.13 
 (2.81) (2.95) (1.81) (1.82) (2.06) (5.84) (4.01)  (5.06) (2.49)
Oil price Q-4 0.08 0.10   0.11 0.17 0.26   0.14 
 (2.00) (1.75)   (2.83) (3.60) (2.84)   (2.86)
Oil price Q-5         0.21  
         (2.38)  
R2 0.85 0.75 0.81 0.77 0.80 0.80 0.65  0.54 0.73 
RESET test 
(p-value) 0.61 0.83 0.48 0.98 0.52 0.56 0.11   0.06 0.18 
Note: Data are quarterly and cover the period from Q-1 1999 to Q-4 2007. Energy and gas HICP inflation reflects quarter-on-quarter 
percentage changes in the price level. Oil prices are quarterly changes in levels, since the overall properties of the regressions are better 
than when percentage changes in the oil price are used. Lags of the order of 1-6 (Q-1 to Q-6) in the oil price were included in the original 
regressions and insignificant regressors were removed subsequently. Numbers in parenthesis refer to t-values.  
RESET test is a statistical test for functional form. In general, other diagnostic tests do not show signs of misspecification. 
  
The results for the euro area as a whole show that changes in oil prices start to pass through to average euro-area energy 
inflation immediately: a 1 euro increase in the oil price translates into a 0.5 pp increase in the q-o-q change in the 
HICP energy component in the current quarter. Changes in the oil price do not appear to have a significant effect on 
energy HICP over the subsequent 2 quarters, whereas the results show that there are significant lagged effects for 3 
and 4 quarters after the oil price change. The y-o-y energy inflation will increase by around 0.75 pp within the first 
year and the effect disappears after 7-8 quarters. 
 
The lag structure of the oil price impact could indicate the importance of oil contracts and futures, setting the oil 
price for companies for up to 6 months. Furthermore, the existence of relatively long lags probably reflects the 
development in the gas component, which is de facto indexed to oil prices.  The results for the sub-component 'gas' 
show that the oil price pass-through to gas prices is slow, with basically no immediate impact and the main impact 
occurring between 2 and 3 quarters after the oil price change. 
The impact of a 1 euro increase in the oil price on y-o-y energy inflation is similar in Germany, Spain, France and 
Italy and is in the range of 0.70-0.75 pp during the first year, before fading out. The dynamic impact, however, is 
rather diverse in the four euro-area Member States. In Germany, the immediate impact on energy HICP inflation is 
similar to that of the euro-area average. The size of the impact in Germany after 3-4 quarters is, however, slightly 
larger. Furthermore, the constant term is larger. The latter could indicate historically significant increases in 
administered energy prices in Germany. 
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In Spain, the immediate oil price impact is very large, 0.66 pp, whereas the lagged effects are smaller than in the euro-
area average. In France, the speed of the oil price pass-through is slightly lower than in Spain but higher than in 
Germany. Italy stands out, in that the dynamic impact from changed oil prices are spread out, quite evenly, over the 
four quarters following the oil price change. 
 
The four countries' HICP energy weights (average 2007) in the HICP index range from 8.6% in Italy to 11.2% in 
Germany. Based on these data, a 1 euro increase in the oil price implies a direct contribution to headline HICP 
inflation (y-o-y) during the first year of: 0.058 pp in Italy, 0.066 pp in France, 0.075 pp in Spain and 0.078 pp in 
Germany. 
Furthermore, the relatively low competition in 
the energy market in Belgium might be one of 
the causes of the current sharp price increases for 
gas and electricity in that country. The 
incumbents' market power in Belgium remains 
high and their presence in transmission and 
distribution network operators is significant. 
The liberalisation of the residential users 
market in 2007 has been only a partial success, 
with particularly slow progress in Brussels. 
Table 7: Euro-area Member States' weights of 
HICP categories compared to euro-area average  
(in pp – 2007) 
 Non-
ener. ind. 
goods 
Energy Unproc. 
food 
Proc. 
food 
Services 
BE 1.8 0.7 0.7 0.0 -3.2 
DE -1.4 1.6 -2.6 -0.3 2.6 
IE -4.1 -0.9 -1.5 1.8 4.7 
EL -1.2 -2.5 0.7 1.4 1.6 
ES -1.5 0.1 4.8 0.5 -3.8 
FR 1.4 -0.8 0.7 -0.3 -1.0 
IT 1.4 -1.0 0.7 0.3 -1.4 
CY -0.4 1.8 0.8 0.9 0.4 
LU 2.6 1.7 -3.3 9.0 -10.0 
MT 2.1 -4.0 0.2 2.4 -0.7 
NL 0.8 0.6 -2.3 -0.4 1.3 
AT -1.1 -1.5 -2.3 -1.8 6.6 
PT 1.1 -0.4 3.7 -1.3 -3.1 
SI 1.1 3.2 -0.3 2.8 -6.8 
FI 0.2 -2.4 -1.2 2.9 0.4 
EA 30.0 9.6 7.6 11.9 40.8 
Source: Commission services. 
 
Box 5 presents estimates of the direct effect of 
changes in oil prices on inflation in the euro area 
as a whole, Germany, Spain, France and Italy. 
The estimations suggest that the pass-through of 
oil price changes into inflation is strong: a 1 euro 
increase in oil prices raises the energy component 
of the HICP by about 0.75 pp and headline 
HICP by about 0.05 pp during the first year 
following the shock. While most of the oil price 
impact on inflation occurs within the first year in 
all four euro-area Member States, the speed of 
the pass-through varies somewhat across 
countries. In Spain and France, the impact occurs 
mainly in the current or current and next quarter, 
whereas in Italy the impact is spread out over the 
first 4-5 quarters. In general, the lag structure 
indicates the importance of oil contracts and 
futures, setting the oil price for companies for up 
to 6 months, and also the lagged development in 
gas prices. 
In addition to direct effects, oil price changes can 
also affect inflation both indirectly and via 
second-round effects. Previous research has 
shown that indirect effects can be substantial, 
with a 1 euro rise in Brent prices contributing 
between 0.02-0.03 pp to core inflation, but that 
these effects occur with a substantial delay of 
between one and three years.16 Overall, the total 
effect of an oil price rise on euro-area HICP 
inflation can be considerable and long-lasting. 
Food inflation and developments in 
agricultural prices 
The average contribution of the food component 
to headline inflation increased markedly across 
euro-area Member States in 2007 compared to 
the period 2000-2006 (Table 8). The total 
contribution of unprocessed and processed food 
prices to headline HICP inflation across euro- 
area Member States ranged between 0.3 and 1.0 
pp in 2007, with the exception of Slovenia, where 
it added about 1½ pp to the annual increase in 
headline inflation. This compares to a long-term 
average contribution of the food component to 
euro-area headline inflation of 0.5 pp. In 2007, 
                                                     
16  See, for example, European Commission (2005), 'The 
impact of higher oil prices on inflation', Quarterly Report 
on the Euro Area, Volume 4, No 4, pp. 28-39. 
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the food component contributed more than 100 
per cent to the overall increase in headline 
inflation in Malta and around 40-45% in 
Belgium, Slovenia and Luxembourg, whereas the 
contribution was less than 20% in Netherlands 
and France. 
Unequal food weights in the HICP baskets can 
explain some of the differences in food price 
contribution to headline inflation. While food 
weights in the HICP baskets are higher in 
Luxembourg, Spain, Slovenia and Malta than the 
euro-area average, the weights are lower in 
Austria, Netherlands and Germany. 
Table 8: Contribution of food prices to 
headline inflation in the Member States 
(in % – 2000-2007) 
Contribution of food 
prices in % of total 
headline inflation 
Weight 
of food 
in HICP  
Food 
inflation 
(y-o-y)  
  
  
2000-2006 2007 2007 2007 
BE 21.7 44.9 20.2 4.0 
DE 20.2 21.7 16.7 3.0 
IE 21.9 25.8 19.9 3.7 
EL 26.2 22.4 21.7 3.1 
ES 30.9 36.3 24.8 4.1 
FR 28.5 18.7 19.9 1.5 
IT 21.5 30.7 20.5 3.0 
CY 41.2 41.6 21.3 4.3 
LU 31.8 37.5 25.3 4.0 
MT 23.6 101.2 22.1 3.2 
NL 14.1 16.8 16.8 1.6 
AT 17.2 26.7 15.5 3.8 
PT 19.0 25.6 21.9 2.8 
SI 20.4 41.2 22.1 7.1 
FI 14.6 25.3 21.3 1.9 
EA 23.5 26.1 19.6 2.8 
Source: Commission services. 
 
Other factors, such as the relative cyclical 
position of euro-area Member States and 
differences in retail market structures, also 
contributed to the cross-country differences in 
food inflation. Malta, for instance, imports 
almost all of its food supplies. Consequently, 
fluctuations in global food prices have a 
significant impact on inflation developments. In 
addition, due to its small size a few food 
importers dominate the market, thereby 
hindering effective competition. In Slovenia, the 
large increases in food prices point to insufficient 
competition in the food retail sector. In France, 
on the other hand, the recent increase in food 
prices has been relatively benign on account of 
measures taken by the French government in 
2004 and in 2007 to enhance competition in the 
retail sector.17 
Table 9: Unprocessed and processed food HICP 
in  euro-area Member States 
(annual change in % – 2005-2007) 
 Unprocessed food Processed food (1) 
  2005 2006 2007 2005 2006 2007 
BE 1.7 3.3 3 2.0 2.1 4.7 
DE 0.8 3.2 2.4 3.6 2.1 3.2 
IE -1.6 2.2 2.8 0.4 0.9 4.1 
EL -1.5 1.9 2.2 2.8 5.2 3.7 
ES 3.3 3.9 4.3 3.5 3.9 3.9 
FR 1.0 2.6 2.2 -0.4 0.6 1.0 
IT -0.7 1.6 3.2 2.2 2.7 2.8 
CY 2.7 8.0 6.1 1.6 2.8 2.9 
LU 1.3 2.7 3.7 5.1 3.0 4.0 
MT 2.2 2.2 4.7 1.5 1.6 2.4 
NL -0.2 3.4 1.5 -0.3 0.6 1.6 
AT 1.1 1.2 3.9 2.6 1.3 3.8 
PT -0.5 3.2 3.0 0.8 4.1 2.6 
SI -0.8 3.1 8.7 0.6 2.5 6.3 
FI 0.0 2.0 4.0 -0.4 1.3 1.0 
EA 0.8 2.8 3.0 2.0 2.1 2.8 
(1) Including alcohol and tobacco. 
Source: Commission services. 
 
A large increase in international agricultural 
commodity prices has been a major factor behind 
the recent increase in euro-area inflation. Since 
January 2006, agricultural commodity price 
indices have increased by about 50%, with half of 
this increase occurring between summer 2007 
and January 2008. During the first half of 2007, 
the price increase accelerated in particular for 
cereals and dairy products. Prices for skimmed 
milk powder in Europe rose by about 80%, 
butter prices by almost 50% and poultry prices 
                                                     
17  The December 2007 reform proposals on the relation 
between suppliers and large retailers were converted into 
a law 'Loi pour le développement de la concurrence au 
service des consommateurs' (law to develop competition 
in favour of consumers) adopted on 3 January 2008. 
According to the French Ministry of Finance estimates, 
the measures envisaged by the law should lead to a 
substantial cut in prices (in particular in national brand 
retail prices), leading to a progressive consumer price 
decline of up to 1.4 pp. 
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by 30% between summer 2006 and summer 
2007. Since then, prices have declined somewhat, 
particularly on dairy products and poultry. The 
price increase on wheat continued throughout 
the course of 2007 and by January 2008 it was 
around 90% higher than a year earlier.  
The driving forces behind the recent price 
increases in agricultural commodities are partly 
temporary and partly structural in nature. Firstly, 
there have been weather-related shortfalls in a 
number of important producing countries. 
Secondly, agricultural world markets are 
becoming tighter due to swelling demand for 
higher-quality food and also on account of 
booming demand in emerging countries. Thirdly, 
rising demand for bio-fuels compounds the tight 
supply situation, particularly in the US, where the 
production of bio-ethanol is estimated to absorb 
around 25% of US maize production. Fourthly, 
the supply response to the growing demand 
seems to be hampered by relatively slower 
productivity growth in agriculture in emerging 
countries and also by limited availability of 
additional fertile farmland. Finally, the surge in 
agricultural commodity prices has been 
supported by a historically low level of 
international stocks. EU intervention stocks have 
been almost completely depleted. 
The pricing of futures markets indicates that, 
although agricultural commodity prices will 
remain at elevated levels, they will decline over 
the next 12 months. This implies that food price 
inflation should decrease in the course of 2008. 
Exchange rates 
The euro has appreciated by more than 6% in 
effective terms over the last twelve months, 
reflecting a broad-based strengthening against 
most major currencies. The appreciation of the 
euro has put downward pressure on inflation, 
helping in particular to mitigate the inflationary 
pressures emanating from international 
commodity markets. 
Available estimates show that the pass-through 
of exchange rate changes to import prices is 
strong in the euro area (about 75%), and rapid, 
with most of the effect occurring in the same 
month.18 The pass-through is largest in Spain, 
Italy and Portugal and smallest in Ireland, Greece 
and Austria. The impact from exchange rates on 
producer and consumer prices is, however, 
smaller and significantly slower. Empirical 
estimates suggest a long-run rate of pass-through 
in the euro area of 23% and 19% for producer 
and consumer prices, respectively.19 Based on 
these estimates, the 36% appreciation of the euro 
since year-end 2000 would have contributed to 
increased household purchasing power of about 
7%, with some of these gains still to come. 
Table 10: Nominal effective exchange rate and 
import prices 
(annual change in % –  2003-2007) (1) 
NEER 
Unit value indices, 
consumption goods 
 average 
2003-06 
2007 average 
2003-06 
2007 (2) 
BE 1.4 1.2 -0.9 -5.3 
DE 1.9 1.7 1.1 0.8 
IE 2.5 2.6 1.4 1.8 
EL 1.5 0.8 1.6 1.8 
ES 1.4 1.2 0.9 0.7 
FR 1.7 1.6 -0.2 -1.3 
IT 1.8 1.6 1.9 2.0 
CY -3.5 -0.3 0.6 1.4 
LU 1.4 1.2 -0.6 1.4 
ML 1.3 2.9 1.5 -2.3 
NL 1.2 1.0 -1.2 5.9 
AT 1.1 0.9 0.2 4.1 
PT 1.1 1.1 0.9 -0.1 
SI -0.7 0.3 -0.3 3.2 
FI 1.8 1.5 -0.3 0.1 
EA 3.7 3.3 0.5 0.9 
(1) The unit value index is for imported goods from outside 
the euro area. 
(2) The increase in the unit value index in 2007 is for the 
period November 2006 to November 2007, on account of the 
available data. 
Source: Commission services.
 
Although the pass-through from import prices to 
consumer prices is not mechanical, developments 
in import prices (based on unit value indices) 
                                                     
18  Campa, J.M., L.S. Golberg and J.M. Gonzalez (2005), 
'Exchange-rate pass-through to import prices in the euro 
area', Documentos de Trabajo No. 0538, Banco De 
España. 
19  European Commission (2007), 'The impact of the euro 
appreciation on domestic prices and the trade 
performance', Quarterly Report on the Euro Area, Vol. 6 
No 2. 
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across euro-area Member States can give a useful 
indication of the impact of exchange rate 
fluctuations on imported inflation (see Table 10). 
The dynamics of import prices in the 
Netherlands, Austria and Slovenia were 
particularly strong in 2007.20 This coincides with 
a modest appreciation of the effective exchange 
rate in these Member States last year. In Malta 
and France, on the other hand, import prices fell 
last year, whereas the exchange rate increase was 
significant. 
The linkage between changes in exchange rates 
and import prices is not however clear in all 
Member States, e.g. Belgium, where a modest 
appreciation of the exchange rate in 2007 
coincided with a substantial decline in import 
prices. The extent to which movements in the 
euro exchange rate affect domestic inflation rates 
varies across Member States, depending on 
factors such as the pattern of international trade, 
cyclical conditions, pricing strategies of foreign 
exporters and the behaviour of domestic retailers 
(related to the degree of competition in domestic 
retail markets).  
                                                     
20  Data on unit value indices for imports suffer from a 
number of shortcomings, which tend to make them less 
reliable than import deflators in national accounts. The 
latter, however, do not distinguish between intra- and 
extra-area origins. 
Conclusion 
While headline inflation in the euro area has been 
high in recent months, inflation dispersion 
amongst euro-area Member States has increased 
significantly since summer 2007. Although 
energy and food prices have accelerated in all 
Member States and contributed substantially to 
the increase in inflation, the global shocks to oil 
and agricultural commodity prices have been 
transmitted to individual countries with varying 
intensity, depending on the weight of food and 
energy in national HICP, as well as on 
idiosyncratic factors such as the degree of 
competition in retail markets and the extent of 
domestic demand pressures. Furthermore, the 
exchange rate pass-through on consumer prices 
has differed across euro-area Member States. 
Looking forward, earlier increases in energy and 
food prices will continue to affect euro-area 
inflation in 2008 through base effects and 
possible second-round effects. While the impact 
will gradually disappear in most euro-area 
Member States, earlier experience suggests that it 
will be different across Member States. 
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Focus 
II. Economic and monetary integration in East Asia: 
Are there lessons to be learned from Europe's experience? 
The European experience of economic and monetary integration has been followed closely in East Asia, especially since the 
Asian financial crisis in the late 1990s. Academics, but also policy-makers, have started to consider whether, mutatis 
mutandis, exchange rate coordination and monetary cooperation might not be a viable way for East Asia to achieve greater 
monetary and financial stability in the region and help to prevent any repetition of the crisis the late 1990s. From a strictly 
economic viewpoint, given the growing intra-regional integration of East Asian economies, greater monetary and exchange rate 
cooperation would have its advantages and could be beneficial to the region. Even if the processes of economic and monetary 
integration in East Asia and Europe will inevitably be different, this focus shows that some aspects of the European 
experience are relevant for the current efforts under way in East Asia to enhance exchange rate coordination and monetary 
cooperation. From a long-term perspective, a case can be made for an Asian Monetary Union. Some of the obstacles are of an 
economic nature, since East Asia is not an optimal currency area and, in most of the countries, major structural changes will 
have to take place before a process of monetary unification can be started. Some other obstacles relate to governance issues and 
require a political commitment to regional integration. Even in a market-driven and institution-light process of economic and 
monetary unification, effective surveillance, based on some form of institutional cooperation, is a precondition to achieving 
successful exchange rate and monetary coordination. This is certainly the main and most important lesson that East Asian 
countries can draw from the European experience.  
1.  Introduction 
The Asian financial crisis in the second half of 
the 1990s provided new momentum to the 
process of East Asia economic and monetary 
integration. However, since then, the progress 
made has been uneven. On the one hand, the 
rapid growth of intra-regional trade has made the 
region increasingly integrated. On the other, 
despite a flurry of (often uncoordinated) 
initiatives (trade agreements, bilateral currency 
swap arrangements, initiatives aimed at creating a 
regional bond market, etc.), from an institutional 
perspective, East Asia economic integration is 
still in its very early stages.  
This focus section argues that the European 
experience provides some guidance for the 
subsequent stages in this process.  Although East 
Asia and Europe are very different and the 
international environment has changed 
dramatically from the time when Europe started 
its unification process, the integration process in 
East Asia can still be informed from Europe’s 
experience. After reviewing the progress made in 
economic and monetary integration in East Asia 
in the last decade, this focus section discusses 
whether East Asia can be considered an optimal 
currency area. It also reviews different 
approaches to achieving exchange rate stability in 
the Asian region and their trade-offs.  The 
analysis then turns to the issue of why and how 
the European experience in terms of exchange 
rate and monetary cooperation can be relevant 
for this region. The final part of the focus is 
devoted to the main obstacles hampering the 
process of Asian economic and monetary 
integration and looks at what useful lessons can 
be learned from the European experience. 
2.  East Asia economic, financial and 
monetary integration 
Through various groupings, … 
The process of East Asia integration mainly takes 
place within three regional frameworks: 
ASEAN,21 ASEAN+3 (i.e. ASEAN plus Japan, 
China and Korea) and the East Asia Summit 
(EAS).22  
                                                     
21 Established in 1967, ASEAN now encompasses 10 
South-East Asian countries (Brunei, Burma/Myanmar, 
Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, the Philippines, 
Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam). 
22 There are also a number of intra-regional groupings, such 
as APEC (a Pacific-wide forum) and ASEM (a forum for 
dialogue between Asia and Europe), and a number of 
economic forums, such as EMEAP (the Executives’ 
Meeting of East Asia-Pacific Central banks), which also 
help to foster regional integration. EMEAP aims at 
enhancing financial and monetary cooperation. It 
comprises the central banks of eleven economies: 
Australia, China, the Philippines, Hong Kong, Indonesia, 
Japan, Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore and 
Thailand. 
 European Commission 
Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs  
 
 
 
- 31 - 
ASEAN is the most advanced framework for 
integration in Asia and the only one that has a 
coordinating structure at regional level (the 
ASEAN Secretariat). The past years have seen its 
integration process accelerate. In 2003, an 
ASEAN Summit agreed to achieve an Economic, 
Security and Social-cultural Community by 2020. 
An ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (AFTA) is 
now in place, with reduced tariffs applying to 
some 95% of intra-ASEAN trade. In 2007, the 
12th ASEAN Summit decided that an ASEAN 
Single Market should be created by 2015, five 
years ahead of schedule, so as to cope more 
effectively with the competitive pressure from 
China and India.  
Since its creation in 1997, the main aim of 
ASEAN+3 has been to provide a framework for 
closer cooperation in East Asia. A Summit 
meeting takes place each year back-to-back with 
the ASEAN Summit. Results have been limited 
so far to noteworthy cooperation, mainly in the 
exchange rate and financial areas.  
Created in 2005, the East Asia Summit is the 
most recent initiative to promote closer 
integration in East Asia. EAS membership is 
wider than ASEAN+3 (it includes ASEAN+3 
plus India, Australia and New Zealand) and it is a 
much looser forum for cooperation than 
ASEAN or ASEAN+3. It is not yet clear how 
EAS will evolve in the future.  
The variable geometry of these frameworks and 
groupings provides some flexibility in the early 
stages of cooperation arrangements, but it often 
unduly complicates the picture and produces a 
plethora of weak agreements that make further 
regional integration difficult to achieve. 
… regional integration in East Asia takes 
place mainly in trade … 
For the past four decades, trade has been the 
engine of economic growth in most of East Asia. 
While unilateral liberalisation of trade has helped 
to initiate export-led development in the region, 
increasing economic integration has been a 
significant factor in supporting the region's 
growth. Graph 13 illustrates the rise in intra-
regional trade in East Asia in the past decades. It 
also shows that regional trade integration has 
reached levels comparable to that of the euro 
area when the EMU project was launched. 
Graph 13: Intra-regional trade  
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China, Hong Kong, Thailand, Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia and 
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Source: IMF Direction of Trade Statistics. 
One of the key features of Asian trade patterns is 
the prominent role taken by vertical trade 
integration through the rapid expansion of 
supply-chain networks. Vertical intra-industry 
trade, involving trade in goods at different stages 
of production, has come to the fore in East Asia, 
with comparative advantage driving countries to 
specialise in those segments of production in 
which they are most efficient. By lowering 
transport and communication costs, 
technological progress has played a key role. 
Another factor behind the expansion of supply-
chain networks has been the strategic reallocation 
by multinational companies of parts of their 
production process to low-cost countries. Falling 
tariff barriers have also supported the trend, 
while the trade policies of East Asian countries 
have also played a role. For instance, trade 
policies that lowered tariff rates on imported 
inputs have raised the effective protection in 
processing industries reliant on such inputs, 
reducing their costs of production and assisting 
their development. An additional key factor has 
been the emergence of China as a major low-
wage producer. There is now a triangular trade 
pattern in Asia, with firms located in more 
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advanced economies using China as a platform 
for final exports to third countries.23 
Another illustration of the intra-regional business 
activity of multinational companies in East Asia 
can be found in the rapid increase in FDI flows 
to and from the region over the past decades – at 
a faster pace than the region's growth in trade – 
and in the fact that many of these flows have 
become intra-regional. 
In this intra-regional trade network, it is often 
argued that East Asian countries are currently 
both 'comrades and competitors'. The similarities 
between the various economies in the region 
have also resulted in increasing rivalry between 
Asian countries for market shares abroad. This 
implies that exchange rate movements between 
the Renminbi and other East Asian currencies 
have become increasingly relevant to trade and 
FDI. 
Graph 14: The noodle bowl syndrome (1) 
 
(1) The map shows FTAs signed or under negotiation in 2006. East 
Asia is defined here as the 10 ASEANs, China, Japan and Korea 
Source: Baldwin, R. (2006), 'Managing the noodle bowl: The 
fragility of East Asian regionalism', CEPR Discussion Papers 
No 5561. 
This intra-regional competitive dynamics has led 
to a proliferation of bilateral and regional trade 
agreements in Asia in recent years, referred to by 
Richard Baldwin as the Asian Noodle Bowl (see 
Graph 14). While fewer than 20 agreements 
notified to the WTO involved East Asian 
countries in 2005, the Asian Development Bank 
(ADB) estimated that almost 110 were signed in 
2006 and over 80 were under negotiation.24 
                                                     
23  See, for example, Zebregs, H. (2004), "Intraregional trade 
in emerging Asia", IMF Policy Discussion Paper 
PDP/04/1 
24  Asian Development Bank (2006), 'The Asian 
development outlook'. 
While about one-third of Asian FTAs involved 
extra-regional partners, the remaining two-thirds 
were between East Asian partners. 
As stressed by the ADB, the proliferation of 
bilateral regional trade agreements in Asia reflects 
both countries’ strategic and political interests 
and their commercial interest in institutionalising 
market-driven integration processes. However, 
the pursuit of overlapping bilateral, regional and 
plurilateral FTAs by Asian countries has resulted 
in multiple agendas for integration. Harmonising 
these agendas to tap the potential of non-
discriminatory approaches to liberalisation, and 
to expand the reach of integration, is a major 
challenge and may become an obstacle to further 
integration. 
… as well as in financial and monetary areas. 
Regional financial cooperation in Asia is 
relatively new. Asian interest in exploring forms 
of financial cooperation increased greatly 
following the 1997-98 Asian financial crisis, 
alongside growing intra-regional trade and 
investment. The main objective has been to 
diversify sources of financing, improve mutual 
surveillance and dialogue and consolidate the 
stability of financial systems. In this regard, the 
main steps taken by East Asian policy-makers are 
the following: 
(1) The Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI). This was 
launched in 2000 and consists of swap 
arrangements aimed at providing short-term 
liquidity support to participating ASEAN+3 
countries facing balance of payments problems. 
(2) The monitoring of Short-Term Capital Flows. 
In 2001, ASEAN+3 Finance ministers agreed on 
bilateral exchange of information on cross-
border short-term capital flows, in a bid to 
promote policy coordination.  
(3) The ASEAN+3 Economic Review and Policy 
Dialogue (ERPD). This was created in 2002 to 
exchange information on economic situations 
and policy issues in the region. It meets once a 
year at Finance minister level and twice a year at 
finance and central bank deputy level. 
(4) The Asian Bond Markets Initiative (ABMI). 
Discussions began in 2002, with the aim of 
developing regional bond markets in East Asia. 
In 2003, ASEAN finance ministers agreed on the 
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establishment of working groups, to be engaged 
primarily in constructing a regional infrastructure 
and in devising plans for harmonising various 
financial standards, regulatory systems and tax 
treatment throughout the region.  
(5) The Asian Bund Funds Initiative. EMEAP 
launched this initiative with the aim of (i) 
providing a catalyst, as a lead investor, for private 
investors to consider investment in Asian bond 
issues, particularly domestic currency bonds, and 
(ii) diversifying investment of foreign currency-
denominated assets held by central banks into 
Asian bonds. This initiative is implemented via 
two different funds: the Asian Bond Fund – 
established in 2003 - which invested USD 1bn in 
a basket of US dollar-denominated bonds issued 
by Asian governments – and the Asian Bond 
Fund 2 – launched in 2005 - which invested 
around USD 2bn in local currency bonds.  
In spite of these initiatives, most observers agree 
that East Asian financial and monetary 
integration is still at the conceptual stage and 
continues to lag when compared with progress 
made in trade integration. Not surprisingly then, 
standard measures of financial integration show 
that global financial integration dominates intra-
regional integration in Asia.25  
3.  Is East Asia an optimal currency area? 
While East Asia could satisfy some of the 
conditions required to be an OCA … 
In its traditional definition, an optimum currency 
area (OCA) is an economic area composed of 
economies with strong intra-regional trade links, 
high correlation of demand and supply shocks, 
and in which labour, capital and other factors of 
production move freely. In such an area, a single 
currency would maximise economic efficiency. 
Although such a definition of an OCA is difficult 
to achieve, the theory of the optimum currency 
area provides a useful benchmark to assess real 
and nominal convergence within a given area. As 
seen above, East Asia’s intra-regional trade 
accounts for a high share of total trade and 
supply chains are particularly well-developed and 
                                                     
25  See, for example, Cowen, D., R. Salgado, H. Shah, L. Teo 
and A. Zanello, (2006), 'Financial integration in Asia: 
Recent developments and next steps', IMF Working 
Paper No 06/196. 
sophisticated. The level of intra-regional 
integration of East Asia is now comparable to 
intra-regional trade within the European Union 
when it decided to create EMU and the single 
currency. In addition, nominal and real wages in 
East Asian countries are relatively flexible, 
possibly more flexible than wages in Europe pre- 
and post-EMU. There is also evidence that 
business cycle synchronisation between members 
of ASEAN+3 – as measured by the bilateral 
correlation of GDP growth rates – has increased, 
especially since the financial crisis.26 A few 
studies have also reported that, with the 
exception of Japan and China, cross-country 
correlations of supply and demand shocks in 
Asia are not much different from those across 
Europe in the early 1990s and are becoming 
stronger over time, although shocks seem to be 
mostly symmetric within two specific groups, i.e. 
ASEAN and North-East Asia.27  
… others still need to be met. 
However, there are other prerequisites for an 
OCA that are not easily met by East Asian 
countries. Intra-regional labour mobility is 
limited. Although there are no reliable statistics 
available, the foreign population share in Asian 
countries is likely to be many times smaller than 
in the European Union, and most East Asian 
countries apply very tight immigration rules, 
which impede intra-regional labour mobility. It is 
argued, however, that domestic labour markets in 
East Asia are more flexible than in the euro area, 
allowing thus for faster adjustment to shocks. As 
a result, the importance of labour mobility as an 
OCA criterion is less relevant for East Asia than 
it was for Europe.28 
                                                     
26  See Rana, P. B. (2007), 'Economic integration in East 
Asia: Trends, prospects, and a possible roadmap.” 
Economic Growth Centre Working Paper Series 
No 2007/01, Nanyang Technological University. 
27  Kwack, S. Y. (2004), 'An optimum currency area in East 
Asia: Feasibility, coordination and leadership', Journal of 
Asian Economics, Vol. 15 No 1, and Zhang, Z., K. Sato and 
M. McAleer (2004), 'Is a monetary union feasible for East 
Asia?', Applied Economics Vol. 36 No 10. 
28  See, for instance, Watanabe, S. and M. Ogura (2006), 
'How far apart are two ACUs from each other? Asian 
Currency Unit and Asian Currency Union', Bank of Japan 
Working Paper Series No 06-E-20 and Kawai, M. (2008), 
'An East Asian currency for an integrated Asia', Asian 
Development Bank (forthcoming). 
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Leaving OCA theory aside, real convergence is 
also lagging. The standard deviation of GDP per 
capita in Asia (in PPP terms) is about two to 
three times that of Europe.29 In addition, the 
correlations of demand and supply disturbances 
show that the effects of external shocks are not 
quite symmetric across East Asian economies 
and this asymmetry is significantly higher than in 
the euro area. This implies that national 
economic structures in East Asia are still 
significantly different and a unified monetary 
policy would have problems in providing an 
appropriate response to external shocks. And 
although East Asian countries are also faster to 
adjust to supply and demand shocks, the large 
size of these disturbances indicates that monetary 
unification would be more costly for East Asia 
than for Europe. 30 
Financial market integration remains insufficient 
despite some decline in cross-market differentials 
in interest rates and bond yields. As mentioned 
above, East Asian financial markets are 
increasingly integrated globally, much more than 
at regional level. In addition, although cross-
border portfolio investment flows in East Asia 
have gradually increased over the past decade (in 
particular for equities), the share of intra-regional 
portfolio investment flows remains limited (6% 
in 2005) compared to the EU-15 (62%).31 
Another prerequisite not met by a number of 
Asian countries is production and consumption 
diversification. High diversification in production 
and consumption weakens the incidence of 
specific sector shocks. Therefore, diversification 
reduces the need for changes in the terms of 
trade via the nominal exchange rate. Highly 
diversified economies are more likely to incur 
reduced costs as a result of forsaking nominal 
exchange rate changes between them. However, 
the patterns of production and consumption of a 
number of ASEAN countries are still not 
diversified enough and make them more 
vulnerable to asymmetric shocks if they cannot 
use any longer the exchange rate instrument.  
Overall, as discussed further in Section 6, East 
Asia departs from an optimal currency area in 
                                                     
29  See Watanabe, S. and M. Ogura (2006), op. cit.. 
30  See Kwack (2004), op. cit. 
31  See, for instance, Cowen et al. (2006), op. cit. 
several respects, as was also the case of the euro 
area when EMU was launched. Furthermore, 
history shows that OCA criteria can partly be 
endogenous in the sense that monetary 
integration affects economic structures and may 
bring the region concerned closer to an OCA.  
4. Toward an East Asia exchange rate 
regime? 
In order to stabilise intraregional exchange 
rates… 
Current exchange rate regimes in East Asia differ 
widely. Most ASEAN countries and Korea have 
managed floats; China and Malaysia have a 
managed peg to the dollar; Hong Kong has a 
hard peg to the dollar; and the Japanese yen 
floats freely. Although de facto the US dollar 
remains the reference currency for all East Asian 
currency regimes (including the free-floating 
Japanese yen), their diversity presents major 
drawbacks, which makes the current exchange 
rate configuration in East Asia far from optimal.  
It is no surprise, therefore, that there is a strong 
interest in the region in proposals aimed at 
enhancing exchange rate cooperation and, in the 
long term, at setting up a process of monetary 
and financial integration. Part of this interest is 
related to the lessons drawn from the Asian 
financial crisis of 1997-98, in particular on the 
issue of contagion. The potential for 'real 
contagion' was thought to be small, given the 
relatively low levels of trade integration at the 
time,32 and the fact that portfolio investment 
among the countries in the region was almost 
non-existent. The crisis showed that this was not 
the case. The crisis was also aggravated by dollar-
peg exchange rate regimes, which were inherently 
unstable and vulnerable to speculative attacks. 
The absence of exchange rate cooperation in the 
region only made things worse.  
In response to the crisis, a number of proposals 
designed to lay the foundations for exchange rate 
cooperation, to introduce a common managed 
floating regime and, in some cases, to create a 
                                                     
32  See Plummer, M. and G. Wignaraja (2007), 'The post-
crisis sequencing of economic integration in Asia: Trade 
as a complement to a monetary future', Asian 
Development Bank, Working Paper Series on Regional 
Economic Integration No 9. 
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currency union as the ultimate goal emerged. 
Both the reorganisation of supply chains in East 
Asia and the successful launch or the euro gave 
new momentum, not only among academics, but 
also among policy-makers and business people, 
to the idea that the region needs enhanced 
currency and monetary coordination to ensure 
greater financial stability and reduce risks related 
to currency crises. 
... and reduce East Asia exposure to global 
imbalances … 
Another argument in favour of exchange rate 
cooperation in Asia is linked to the persistence of 
global current account imbalances and the rapid 
accumulation of foreign exchange reserves in 
East Asia, which have played an important role 
in financing the US current account deficit.33 
Reserve accumulation prevents East Asian 
currencies from appreciating against the dollar, 
but it may also have unintended consequences 
(for instance, on money supply and inflation). To 
limit these effects, East Asian central banks have 
engaged in extensive sterilisation and, in fact, so 
far have been successful in preventing money 
supply growth from accelerating excessively. 
However, sterilisation also produces undesired 
effects. As a result, commercial banks end up 
holding central bank bills yielding low interest 
rates. This erodes banks’ profitability and affects 
credit allocation. In addition, the huge 
accumulation of dollar-denominated assets 
exposes East Asian monetary authorities to large 
losses if the dollar goes through rapid 
depreciation. 
The risk of an abrupt fall in the US dollar and 
parallel appreciation of East Asian currencies has 
become even more prominent amidst the current 
financial turmoil. While some currency 
appreciation would be desirable in most East 
Asian countries (in particular those facing strong 
domestic inflationary pressures), such an 
appreciation, if the currencies move in an 
uncoordinated way, would also damage some 
countries’ international price competitiveness, 
                                                     
33  See Yoshitomi, M., (2007), 'Global imbalances and East 
Asian monetary cooperation', in Chung D.K. and B. 
Eichengreen (eds.), Toward an East Asian Exchange Rate 
Regime, Brookings Institution Press. 
and all countries would face significant capital 
losses. 
To address the pitfalls of the de facto peg to the 
dollar, a number of proposals have been put 
forward to enhance exchange rate coordination 
and monetary policy cooperation in East Asia, 
and ultimately to abandon the de facto dollar peg 
for a basket of currencies. 
… several proposals have been made. 
Most of the proposals/initiatives aimed at 
achieving exchange rate stability in East Asia can 
be divided into four types of possible currency 
arrangements (some of which can be a variant of 
a multi-stage process towards monetary union): 
(1) The creation of bilateral swap agreements 
(BSAs) between East Asian countries. The goal 
of BSAs’ is to provide liquidity assistance at 
bilateral level. The main aim is to build a 
defensive system against future crises and 
discourage speculative attacks against the 
currencies of countries that have subscribed to 
BSAs. They can also be a first step in the process 
of monetary and financial integration, as they can 
constitute a test to the readiness of countries to 
cooperate in tense and difficult conditions.  
BSAs between ASEAN countries pre-dated the 
crisis, but their small size was no match for the 
turmoil of the late 1990s. To make them effective 
after the financial crisis, Japan, China and Korea 
were called in. In 2000,  ASEAN+3 Finance 
ministers agreed in Chiang Mai to set up a 
network of BSAs of a much bigger size than past 
arrangements, now known as the Chiang Mai 
Initiative (CMI). In 2007, the 17 bilateral swaps 
among ASEAN+3 countries had grown to the 
sizeable level of almost 83 billion US$.   
The CMI, however, is unsatisfactory for several 
reasons. There are in particular concerns about 
the way and the speed with which BSAs would 
be activated. While delays in BSA activation may 
undermine an effective defence of the currency, a 
partial BSA activation, with some countries 
declining to lend their support, may even be 
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worse, feeding speculative attacks against the 
currency under pressure.34  
Therefore, it is hardly surprising that, despite 
signing a panoply of BSAs, almost all East Asian 
countries have dramatically increased the amount 
of their reserves, de facto signalling that they did 
not consider BSAs to be either credible or 
effective. As shown in Graph 15, the Chiang Mai 
Initiative has not had a mitigating impact on 
reserve accumulation in East Asia, which is now 
more than 30 times bigger than the BSAs in total.  
Acknowledging these drawbacks, most of the 
ASEAN+3 participating countries agree that the 
CMI network needs to be supported by an 
independent monitoring and a surveillance 
system and that the CMI should be 
multilateralised. This "multilateralisation of the 
CMI" includes the creation of a secretariat or 
committee that could allow joint activation of all 
BSAs of a requesting country to facilitate a 
concerted and timely reaction in the event of a 
crisis. This kind of collective decision-making 
mechanism has been agreed in principle, but the 
details of it still need to be worked out.  
Graph 15: Foreign exchange reserve accumulation in 
East Asia (USD bn) 
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 (2) The creation of a multilateral swap 
arrangement (MSA) would allow rising the 
effectiveness and credibility of the defensive 
system in place and increasing the commitment 
to monetary cooperation in East Asia.35 
                                                     
34  Another drawback of CMI is that, under the current 
arrangement, the duty of surveillance falls to the lending 
country, which may have only limited information on the 
real situation that the borrowing country may be facing. 
35  See Kwack (2004) op. cit. 
Compared to BSAs, MSAs have the advantage of 
really pulling together the financial resources of 
the participating countries. Furthermore, it would 
send out a signal that all East Asian countries 
stand behind the economy under attack. Once in 
place, contrary to BSAs, an MSA cannot function 
without a system of monitoring and surveillance, 
in order to allow collective solution to payment 
defaults.36  
Although not in place yet, in 2007, the 
ASEAN+3 Finance ministers' agreed in principle 
that a self-managed reserve pooling (SMRP) 
arrangement governed by a single contractual 
agreement would be an appropriate form of 
multilateralisation' of the existing system.  
The SMRP project would replace the current 
CMI network. It would be set up as an 
independent fund managed by the Central bank 
Governors, who would also be supposed to 
harmonise their monetary policies; this implies a 
system of collective surveillance. Being a legally 
binding and enforceable agreement, it would 
provide effective protection for the participating 
countries. This, in turn, would guarantee the 
required credibility of the system. Under certain 
conditions (see next section), the SMRP could 
prove to be effective in fending off speculative 
attacks without raising major moral hazard 
problems.  
(3) While the function of bilateral and multilateral 
swap arrangements is mainly defensive and aims 
at countering speculative attacks against one or 
more currencies, the adoption of a managed float 
based on a basket numeraire of the currencies of 
the major trading powers would bring monetary 
and currency cooperation to a much more 
advanced stage. This proposal suggests that each 
country should peg its own currency to a basket 
composed of the currencies of the dollar, the 
euro and the yen, the so-called YES basket.37 
Each country would tolerate a pre-determined 
range of deviations from a central rate and 
review this rate when needed.  
                                                     
36 Park, Y. C. and C. Wyplosz (2008), 'Monetary and 
financial integration in East Asia: The relevance of the 
European experience', Preliminary draft report to the 
European Commission, January. 
37  There are various versions of the YES basket, some of 
which, the so-called G3-plus currency baskets, also 
include emerging East Asian currencies. 
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The key feature of this system is that it would 
reduce nominal effective exchange rate 
fluctuations both between Asian countries and 
between Asian countries and the rest of the 
world. Hence, the regime 'would guarantee that 
no change in third-country exchange rates would 
disturb the trading relationships among the East 
Asian countries themselves'.38  
(4) The adoption of a managed or free float 
based on the creation of a parallel currency, the 
Asian Currency Unit (ACU), whose value would 
be defined as a basket of East Asian currencies.39 
The creation of an ACU would advance the 
process of East Asian monetary integration a 
step further. It would be used as a calculation 
unit for intra-regional trade and foreign exchange 
reserves. According to its proponents, it could 
also serve as a measure of divergences of Asian 
currencies from a regional average. Some 
economists even envisage the issuance of ACU-
denominated bonds. 
Eichengreen (2007) suggests that the ACU 
should be allowed to circulate alongside existing 
East Asian currencies. A "virtuous" circle could 
materialise, where the advantages of using the 
ACU would increase while integration would 
deepen, which would, in turn, reduce (both 
financial and logistical) transaction costs of the 
use of a parallel currency and would further 
stimulate intra-regional trade and investment.  
The major risk related to the ACU as a parallel 
currency is the possibility of financial turmoil. It 
will indeed allow the emergence of currency 
mismatches (i.e. differences in currency 
composition between assets and liabilities), which 
could become a source of vulnerability if the 
system were to lose its credibility.40 Eichengreen 
                                                     
38  See Williamson, J. (2005), 'A currency basket for East 
Asia, not just China', Policy Briefs in International 
Economics, PB05-1, Institute for International 
Economics. As additional advantages of a common YES 
basket, Williamson mentions that it would facilitate 
further regional monetary integration and a possible 
'Plaza-type agreement, under which all the countries of 
developing East Asia adjusted their currency values 
simultaneously'. 
39  See Chung D.K. and B. Eichengreen (2007), op. cit. 
40  This is paradoxical in certain aspects: the efforts to 
improve the coordination of exchange rate policies, 
started in response to the Asian financial crisis, would end 
(2007) argues that one of the advantages of the 
ACU is therefore that it would highlight the 
urgency of reforms to strengthen supervision and 
regulation and to promote investor discipline. 
5.  Why and how the European 
experience can be useful for East Asia 
East Asia is not Europe … 
Europe opened the way for regional economic 
integration. As a pragmatic first mover, through a 
process of trial and error, it has progressed for 
over 50 years. Although its integration 
sequencing cannot be reproduced, the 
effectiveness and desirability of the choices made 
can be assessed. Therefore, they can provide 
some guidance for other countries that want to 
follow the path of regional integration, even if 
this path will necessarily be different. 
A word of caution is however needed when 
regional economic integration in East Asia and 
Europe is compared. Both regions are very 
different. From an economic viewpoint, Europe 
is much more homogeneous than East Asia, 
which includes some of the richest and some of 
the poorest countries in the world. East Asia is 
also much more polarised by size than the 
European Union or the euro area. While the two 
biggest economies in the euro area make up less 
than 50% of its GDP, in East Asia, the share of 
China and Japan in total GDP is around 75% 
(see Graph 16). In addition, while Germany and 
France are close allies and have developed very 
strong political and cooperation ties, China and 
Japan are not only economic partners, but also 
strategic rivals, with different political regimes 
and belonging, among other things, to different 
systems of alliances. 
The integration path followed by Europe, i.e. to 
proceed from a free trade area to a single market 
and from there to monetary and financial 
integration, cannot be reproduced by East Asia, 
since, because of globalisation, trade and 
financial integration are taking place in parallel.41 
                                                                              
up reproducing some of the conditions that made that 
crisis possible.   
41  For instance, the capital controls with which the 
European Community was able to delay the move to 
financial integration are not present in Asia. 
Quarterly Report on the Euro Area I/2008 
 
 
 
- 38 - 
However, this does not mean that it is impossible 
to draw inferences from the European 
experience, in particular in the area of monetary 
and exchange rate cooperation and integration. 
On many key issues this experience transcends 
the concrete historical experience of Europe and 
has a more general dimension.42 
… but the European experience in terms of 
exchange rate coordination and monetary 
cooperation is valuable to East Asia. 
When looking at the process of monetary 
unification in Europe, it is probably correct to 
infer that, since the integration process in East 
Asia is still in its early stages, the periods that are 
presently most relevant for this region are the 
coordination attempts of the 1970s and the 
European Monetary System more than the euro 
and EMU.  
As we shall see, this does not imply that there are 
no useful lessons to be learned from the 
transition to the single currency and from the 
first 10 years of the euro, in particular if the 
ultimate objective of cooperation efforts in East 
Asia is to create a currency union. 
In its process of monetary and exchange rate 
coordination, the European Community did not 
set up any bilateral swap arrangements. Because 
of their many shortcomings, European countries 
discarded them from the beginning. The long 
                                                     
42  Eichengreen, B. (2007), 'Integrating Asia: Lessons from 
Europe', paper presented at the conference 'Integrating 
Asian economies: Ten years after the crisis', Bangkok, 
18 July 2007. 
survival of the Chiang Mai Initiative in its current 
format is mostly due to the fact that it has never 
really been tested. There was talk of activating it 
in 2005 when the Indonesian and Philippine 
currencies came under pressure, but in the end, it 
was not needed, and the CMI has gone untested 
to this day.  
As in the case of early European exchange rate 
coordination attempts, such as the Short-Term 
Monetary Facility and the European Monetary 
Cooperation Fund (which, however, were not 
bilateral, but multilateral arrangements), the real 
value added of CMI is elsewhere, namely in its 
symbolism. In 2000, Asian countries used it to 
signal that, after the financial crisis, they were 
ready to gear up their exchange rate cooperation. 
However, in the absence of a well-defined 
regional institutional setting and strong political 
determination to move towards East Asian 
regional integration, the approach had to be slow 
and gradual. BSAs would be the first step in such 
a gradual process. The hope was also that, as was 
the case for the first attempts of monetary and 
currency cooperation in Europe, they would help 
to build confidence and trust between economic 
and monetary policy-makers and create the 
conditions for an effective surveillance process, 
which, as the European experience shows, is a 
prerequisite to moving to enhanced forms of 
monetary and exchange rate coordination. 
Although failing to create the mechanisms for 
effective surveillance by setting up a regional 
forum for policy dialogue on monetary and 
financial issues, the CMI can be considered to be 
partially successful at this early stage of Asian 
exchange rate cooperation.  
Graph 16: Comparison between euro-area and Asia GDP shares 
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As it now stands, with all its limits, the CMI is 
the most advanced institutional process so far 
developed by ASEAN+3 countries on their way 
to enhanced monetary and exchange rate 
cooperation. Therefore, it will be from the CMI 
experience that East Asian policy-makers will 
have to start when they decide to move forward 
in the project of regional economic integration.  
As a result, mutatis mutandis, some goals of the 
Chiang Mai Initiative are common to those of 
European policy-makers in the 1970s, namely to 
create the conditions for closer dialogue and 
surveillance through the setting-up of 
mechanisms requiring the involvement of 
national economic authorities at regional level. In 
this respect, the European experience proved 
successful since it was able to create both the 
political momentum and the institutional 
framework that, despite the failure of early 
attempts, such as the European Monetary 
Cooperation Fund and the European Monetary 
Snake, would lead twenty-five years later to the 
successful introduction of the euro. 
However, with 17 BSAs signed and never 
activated and more than 3 trillion dollars of 
accumulated currency reserves, it is clear that, in 
its current format, the Chiang Mai Initiative has 
probably exhausted its role. Its continuation 
without any change or its mere expansion (as it 
happened in 2005 with the doubling of the swap 
amounts) would have been interpreted as a 
stalemate in the process of regional integration. 
The decision to look into the possibility of a 
multilateral swap arrangement (MSA) is certainly 
designed to give new momentum to the 
integration process and to put in place an 
effective mechanism to counter any currency 
turmoil.  
The MSA presents some similarities with the 
Short-Term Monetary Facilities (STMF), where 
the six members of the European Community 
pledged to lend pre-declared amounts to each 
other, on request. The facilities were introduced 
in 1970 and, in 1972, became the European 
Monetary Cooperation Fund, which collected the 
reserves pledged under STMF. It was managed 
by the central bank governors, and its board was 
supposed to exert some form of surveillance, 
which proved to be very limited, however. In the 
same way, Park and Wyplosz (2008) find some 
similarities between the proposal of Self-
Managed Reserve Pooling in East Asia under the 
CMI and the experience of the European 
Monetary Cooperation Fund (EMCF) in Europe. 
They argue that one of the lessons to be drawn 
from this experience is that reserve pooling can 
evolve equally into either a virtuous or a vicious 
circle. For instance, participating countries need 
guarantees that moral hazard will be contained 
before they agree to pool sizeable amounts of 
reserves. Therefore, while the size of the pooled 
reserves might not be an issue among ASEAN+3 
members (given the large accumulated reserves in 
the region), the proposal will have to overcome 
several political and institutional obstacles before 
it can be implemented.  
One way of overcoming some of these obstacles 
is to merge the two existing surveillance 
mechanisms, the “Economic Review and Policy 
Dialogue” (EPRD) at the level of ASEAN+3 
Ministers of finance and the EMEAP at the level 
of Central bank Governors. This would create a 
surveillance structure similar to that in place in 
the EU with the ECOFIN and the Economic 
and Financial Committee (EFC) that include 
representatives of the financial ministry and 
central bank of the Member states, the European 
Commission and the ECB.43 This kind of 
structure, with a clear political mandate, would in 
fact have the political weight to implement 
enhanced peer review and “due diligence” 
processes. This merger would be far from easy, 
however, not least because the countries 
participating in EPRD and EMEAP are not the 
same, the level of central bank independence 
varies, and the member states would have to 
abandon some of their sovereign prerogatives, 
etc. In addition, it would require a political 
agreement on which countries should be in the 
initial Asian Community.44 Nevertheless, an 
                                                     
43  In reality, an East Asian ECOFIN and EFC would 
probably be the final step of a process that, as in the case 
of Europe, would start from looser forms of cooperation 
and coordination. This was the case with the Monetary 
Committee, the institutional framework that carried out 
the economic surveillance and the coordination of 
exchange rate policies when the European Monetary 
System (EMS) was set up. 
44  Although ASEAN+3 seems the most likely grouping, so 
far there has been no official statement as to who is in 
and who is out. In this respect, the recent creation of the 
EAS (de facto an ASEAN+6 grouping) complicates the 
picture further. Furthermore, it seems to indicate that 
there is not much clarity (and probably conflicting 
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"East Asian ECOFIN and EFC", supported – as 
suggested by Kawai (2008) – by an “independent 
secretariat” would be a milestone in the process 
of exchange rate and monetary coordination and 
would create strong momentum to move the 
integration process forward. 
Should East Asian nations decide to peg their 
currencies to a basket composed of the euro, the 
dollar and the yen (or a G3 plus currency basket) 
the European experience could be less 
enlightening than in other scenarios. When they 
decided to create their own basket, European 
countries chose a basket from among their own 
currencies. This basket was floating freely vis-à-
vis the dollar. Europe’s choice was dictated by 
the objective of developing the single market 
further and avoiding currency tensions (in 
particular, competitive devaluations) among the 
Member States. The aim of a YES basket would 
be somewhat different: as pointed out by 
Williamson (2005), a common basket numeraire 
based on the dollar, the euro and the yen would 
be a better solution than the de facto dollar peg for 
fear of losing competitiveness vis-à-vis their 
regional peers. In addition, a YES basket would 
certainly help in the medium term to ensure that 
the valuation of East Asian currencies evolves 
more in line with economic fundamentals than in 
the current de facto peg to the dollar. However, it 
would keep the East Asian countries in an 
export-led growth framework, where exchanges 
with the rest of the world matter more than 
intra-regional trade. In the absence of further 
steps toward enhanced exchange rate 
coordination, this choice may not be very 
forward-looking, since East Asia’s export-led 
growth models are not sustainable in the long 
run and they exacerbate global imbalances.  
However, as seen above, a YES basket could also 
be an intermediate step towards closer monetary 
and exchange rate cooperation. This would imply 
the creation of an Asian Currency Unit and a 
formal exchange rate mechanism, for which the 
European experience, especially as regards the 
EMS, would become particularly relevant. As 
pointed out by Park and Wyplosz (2008), an 
                                                                              
interests) as to the type of regional integration that Asian 
policy-makers intend to set up. As a result, the widening 
of regional groupings will be much faster than the 
deepening of such groupings. 
exchange rate mechanism would provide 
something that is still missing in Asia: an anchor 
for surveillance, which could focus the attention 
of policy-makers on whether the policy pursued 
is compatible with the exchange rate regime.  
In addition, in a system with formal exchange 
rate policy coordination, such as the EMS, 
exchange rate realignments must be agreed upon 
by all members of the exchange rate mechanism. 
The European experience has shown that such a 
mechanism has worked because European 
countries were ready to think economic policy in 
line with the requirements of the exchange rate 
regime and were ready to share detailed 
information with their partners on the economic 
situation and the problems they encountered. 
Despite good cooperation between ERM 
members and some capital controls in place, 
inflation differentials and differences in 
economic policies required frequent parity 
realignments among the members of the 
European Monetary System. In 1992, a major 
currency crisis could not be avoided; this 
triggered significant currency realignments and 
led to the fluctuation bands being widened. To 
be viable and to withstand financial market 
turbulence and/or speculative attacks, pre-
determined ranges for intra-regional exchange 
rate variations may require a commitment to 
establish a currency union in the not too distant 
future.45 In the absence of such a commitment, it 
is unlikely that, in a world of globalised finance, a 
pegged exchange rate regime involving multiple 
countries can be defended indefinitely, even if all 
participants make firm policy commitments.  
6.  Asian economic and monetary 
integration in a wider context 
East Asia is not an Optimum Currency 
Area… 
Is an Asian Monetary Union possible and 
conceivable? As we have already seen, some 
economic indicators show that the level of 
economic integration among ASEAN+3 
countries is similar to that of euro-area Member 
                                                     
45  The problems for Asia could be bigger than those faced 
by Europe in the past, in particular because capital flows 
in Asia can move much more freely today and are of 
much bigger size, making it much more difficult for East 
Asian countries to stabilise their exchange rates around a 
central parity.  
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States ahead of the launch of EMU; business 
cycles have become more correlated, and the 
correlation of demand and supply shocks has 
increased. And, like the EU, the potential gains 
from having an economic and monetary union 
are far from negligible. However, on a number of 
issues, East Asia is not at the same level as 
“Europe in the late ’80s” (labour mobility, 
regulatory harmonisation, obstacles to intra-
regional trade, consumption patterns, etc.).  
Nominal and fiscal convergence is still far from 
being achieved, as the simple exercise in Box 6 
shows.46 Indicators regarding real convergence 
show even greater divergence. Clearly, East Asian 
countries exhibit much more variability than the 
current European Union or even Central and 
Eastern European countries.47 As pointed out by 
Wyplosz (2001), 'this variability reflects deep 
differences in terms of economic structure. The 
absence of real convergence is Asia’s Achilles 
                                                     
46  In the late 1980s/early 1990s, several euro-area Member 
States did not fulfil the criteria either.  
47  See Wyplosz, C. (2001); 'A monetary union in Asia? Some 
European lessons', in Gruen, D., and J. Simon (eds.), 
Future Directions for Monetary Policies in East Asia, 
Reserve Bank of Australia. 
heel'. Although real convergence has increased 
since 2001, the levels of development of East 
Asian countries are still very different. Moving, 
with some chance of success, toward economic 
and monetary unification in East Asia will require 
huge structural changes in the region and difficult 
and painful structural reforms. 
East Asia is not an optimal currency area, 
although some sub-groups of countries may not 
be so far from being one and other countries are 
converging, albeit slowly. Therefore, if well 
prepared and not introduced too hastily, most 
East Asian countries could benefit from the 
creation of a monetary union. From an economic 
viewpoint, effective East Asia monetary 
integration could bring greater intra-regional 
trade and investment, eliminate exchange rate 
risks, reduce the impact of international financial 
turmoil when it occurs, avoid intra-regional 
tensions related to possible “competitive 
devaluations”, counter speculative attacks, 
eliminate the transaction costs related to the 
presence of different currencies in the region, 
reduce the dependence on the dollar of the 
exchange rate regime and favour a better 
allocation of resources in the region. It is also 
important to stress that, before deciding to move 
Box 5: Would East Asia satisfy the Maastricht Criteria? 
The Maastricht criteria provide a useful toolbox to assess a region's degree of nominal and fiscal convergence. The 
table below summarises the reference values for ASEAN+3 member countries. 
 
Maastricht convergence criteria in East Asia 
  Inflation rate (1) Interest rate (2) Fiscal balance (3) Gross public debt (4) 
Brunei  0.2 -- -- -- 
Cambodia 4.7 -- -3.1 41.4 
China 1.5 3.9 -0.8 17.9 
Indonesia 13.1 9.6 -1.0 38.6 
Japan 0.3 1.7 -3.3 193.1 
Korea 2.2 5.3 -1.3 32.2 
Laos  6.8 -- -3.7 69.6 
Malaysia 3.6 3.7 -3.8 62.5 
Myanmar 25.7 -- -- -- 
Philippines 6.2 7.2 -1.9 77.4 
Singapore 1 2.9 6 102.7 
Thailand 4.6 4.1 0.1 42.3 
Vietnam 7.5 10.4 -3.8 45.3 
Note: numbers in bold exceed the reference values set out in the Maastricht Treaty. 
(1) The reference value for the inflation criterion is calculated as the average of the three lowest inflation rates + 1.5 pp. 
(2) The reference value for the interest rate criterion is calculated as the average of the interest rates of the three countries with the lowest 
inflation rates + 2 pp. 
(3) The reference value for fiscal balance is -3% of GDP. 
(4) The reference value for gross public debt is 60% of GDP (or the country should be approaching this level at a satisfactory rate). 
 
The table shows that, in 2006, no group of countries would have met the Maastricht reference values and that most 
countries do not satisfy at least two of the criteria. It is however worth noting that, with the exception of Japan, 
Singapore, and, to a lesser extent, the Philippines, the public finances criteria are met by almost all countries.  
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forward toward a single currency, the EU was 
not an optimal currency area and neither is Asia 
at this stage of integration. The endogeneity of 
an optimal currency area shows that it is not 
necessary for a region to be a proper OCA 
before moving to monetary integration, since 
setting up the process will create its own 
momentum and accelerate the process. 
... but the main challenge to integration is 
political more than economic. 
However, the political will and the institutional 
infrastructure that created the momentum for the 
endogenous development of an optimal currency 
area in Europe are for the time being simply not 
there in East Asia. This is, in fact, the biggest 
challenge that the region has to address if it really 
wants to move to enhanced levels of exchange 
rate coordination and monetary cooperation, 
and, ultimately, to a monetary union. As the 
European experience shows, even a gradual 
process will not necessarily be successful if a 
number of key issues are not successfully tackled. 
It is to these issues that the final part of this 
paper is devoted.  
The first key issue to be addressed is mutual trust 
and readiness to cooperate in a regional 
framework. At this stage, East Asian countries do 
not seem ready to give up part of their sovereign 
prerogatives and to allow other countries to 
intervene/interfere in the implementation of 
national economic policies. However, the 
European experience shows that without 
effective multilateral surveillance even 
multilateral swap arrangements become 
problematic. This is an issue that can be solved 
only at political level and that will be difficult to 
address fully as long as East Asian countries look 
at their neighbours not only as partners, but also 
as rivals in both the economic and political 
sphere. History, different political regimes, 
regional rivalries, unresolved border disputes, 
and different systems of military alliances make 
regional political and economic cooperation 
much more difficult and complicated in East 
Asia than in Europe. Against this background, 
effective multilateral economic surveillance is in 
fact a key political decision.  
The second key issue relates to the first: can 
countries overcome their mistrust and their 
entrenched rivalries mainly through an 
intergovernmental process? Even in Europe, 
where countries have made their peace with 
history and the fear of the emergence of a 
superpower is almost non-existent, mere 
intergovernmental cooperation proved to be a 
slow, cumbersome and often unsuccessful 
process. For this reason, even intergovernmental 
decision-making procedures in the European 
Union are facilitated if the European 
Commission plays an active role in them. 
Although the creation of an East Asian 
Commission is not on the agenda, it is difficult to 
see how a synthesis at regional level that is more 
than a minimum common denominator can be 
pushed forward without a regional institution 
with a high degree of independence from the 
various Member States. 
Given the political realities in East Asia, some 
economists think that an institution-light 
intergovernmentally-driven Asian Community 
could be envisaged. They suggest that, rather 
than trying to build strong regional institutions 
and delegate sovereign prerogatives to them, East 
Asia should borrow another example of 
governance from the European experience: the 
open method of coordination, whereby countries 
share information and best practices and exert 
forms of peer support and peer pressure to 
encourage the implementation of agreed policies. 
They admit that the final outcome would be a 
much more 'loosely configured grouping than the 
European Union',48 in which surveillance and 
peer pressure would be much more of a problem 
and difficult to implement. 
It is clear that without some form of regional 
institutional infrastructure to provide analytical 
input and put forward independent proposals on 
how to foster regional monetary cooperation, 
progress might not only be extremely slow and 
painstaking, but also dangerously dependent on 
how political and economic relations evolve 
between the major powers in the region. As a 
result, short periods of enhanced cooperation 
can be followed by long periods of inaction, as 
has been the case, for instance, in recent years. 
Even an institution-light, market-driven Asian 
Community cannot operate effectively without 
some form of independent institutions. In this 
                                                     
48  See Eichengreen (2007b), op. cit., p.18 
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respect, an Asian Community whose governance 
is based on the “open method of coordination” 
cannot really aspire to the creation of an 
economic and monetary union, even in the long 
term. As Eichengreen (2007) recognises, 'the 
open method of coordination […] is better for 
encouraging policies to foster the development 
of Asian financial markets or for helping central 
banks to learn how to back regimes of greater 
exchange rate flexibility with inflation targeting 
than for, say, establishing a single regional 
competition policy or agreeing to move to a 
single currency'.  
Therefore, an Asian currency for an integrated 
Asia can only be achieved if East Asian countries 
already exhibit the political determination at the 
early stages of the process to abandon some of 
their own sovereign prerogatives and to 
cooperate openly and candidly, accepting some 
political interference from the other members in 
their policy choices. This inevitably means the 
creation of regional institutions (an enhanced 
EPRD, an independent secretariat) that can make 
sure that real surveillance and peer pressure are 
effectively implemented. 
7.  Conclusions 
Are there lessons that East Asia can learn from 
the process of European monetary unification? 
Despite the huge differences between East Asia 
and Europe’s processes of regional integration, 
this focus replies in the affirmative to the 
question. Three different types of lessons are 
identified: (1) lessons related to European reserve 
and exchange rate arrangements of the past, 
which have some similarities with East Asian 
arrangements currently being implemented or 
under consideration; (2) lessons related to the 
transition stages towards formal exchange rate 
coordination and, possibly, an Asian currency 
union; and (3) lessons related to decision-making 
and governance. This does not mean that East 
Asia has to follow in EMU’s footsteps. The 
world has dramatically changed since the process 
of monetary unification started in Europe more 
than thirty years ago, and the integration 
sequence pursued by Europe cannot be 
replicated in East Asia. Furthermore, while the 
integration process in Europe was politically and 
institutionally as much as economically driven, in 
East Asia it has been mainly market-driven, 
which implies that its institutional framework will 
be lighter than Europe’s, even once (should this 
ever happen) a single Asian currency is 
introduced and an Asian Central bank is created. 
However, even an institution-light monetary 
unification process cannot afford lax and 
ineffective surveillance. The European lesson in 
this respect is clear from start to finish, from the 
first uncertain steps toward exchange rate 
cooperation to EMU: mutual surveillance works 
and is effective, especially if it is backed by clear 
procedures carried through by independent 
regional institutions. Although it can evolve in 
time from simple peer review to structured forms 
of monitoring with specific rules and possible 
sanctions (as in the case of the Stability and 
Growth Pact), it remains the most important 
precondition, without which it is very difficult to 
move forward exchange rate and monetary policy 
coordination, and, a fortiori, to an Asian monetary 
union. 
Last but not least, is it in Europe’s interest that 
East Asia should succeed in its efforts to gear up 
exchange rate and monetary cooperation? On 
this count, too, the answer is in the affirmative: if 
East Asian countries are able to achieve greater 
intra-regional currency stability, they will have far 
more scope to let their currencies appreciate 
without the fear of significant competitive losses 
to their neighbours. This could help support a 
more orderly unwinding of global imbalances. It 
could also help avoid a situation where the euro 
has to bear most of the weight of the exchange 
rate correction needed to tackle these imbalances. 
In addition, monetary integration in East Asia 
could bring more stability to the region and help 
to avoid disruptive crises, as it happened in 1997-
98. This, in turn, would reduce uncertainty and 
foster economic growth. Thus, learning the right 
lessons from EMU is not only in the interest of 
East Asia, since the positive spillovers from 
effective and successful monetary and exchange 
rate coordination among East Asian countries 
can have beneficial effects both on the EU and 
on the world economy. 
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The Impact of the Euro on International Stability and Volatility 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/publication_summary12271_en.htm 
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Key indicators for the euro area (presents the most relevant economic statistics concerning the euro area)  
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V. Key indicators for the euro area 
 
1 Output 2005 2006 2007 Aug-07 Sept-07 Oct-07 Nov-07 Dec-07 Jan-08
 Industrial confidence 1.1 Balance -7.2 2.2 4.4 4.7 2.6 1.7 2.6 1.6 1.2
 Industrial production 1.2 mom % ch 1.4 4.0 3.5 1.2 -0.9 0.6 -0.4 -0.2 --
  2005 2006 2007 06Q3 06Q4 07Q1 07Q2 07Q3 07Q4 
 Gross domestic product 1.3 qoq. % ch 1.5 2.8 2.7 0.6 0.8 0.8 0.3 0.8 0.4
2 Private consumption 2005 2006 2007 Aug-07 Sept-07 Oct-07 Nov-07 Dec-07 Jan-08
 Consumer confidence 2.1 Balance -13.9 -9.1 -4.9 -3.9 -5.7 -6.2 -8.1 -8.7 -11.5
 Retail sales 2.2  mom % ch 1.2 2.1 0.8 0.0 0.2 -0.6 -0.6 -0.2 --
  2005 2006 2007 06Q3 06Q4 07Q1 07Q2 07Q3 07Q4 
 Private consumption 2.3 qoq. % ch 1.6 1.9 -- 0.5 0.5 0.0 0.6 0.5 --
3 Investment 2005 2006 2007 06Q3 06Q4 07Q1 07Q2 07Q3 07Q4 
 Capacity utilization 3.1 % 81.3 83.0 84.2 83.6 83.9 84.4 84.8 84.1 84.0
 Gross fixed capital formation 3.2 qoq. % ch 2.8 5.2 -- 0.7 1.6 1.8 -0.1 1.2 --
 Change in stocks 3.3 % of GDP 0.1 0.3 -- 0.5 0.0 0.5 0.2 0.4 --
4 Labour market 2005 2006 2007 Aug-07 Sept-07 Oct-07 Nov-07 Dec-07 Jan-08
 Unemployment 4.1 % 8.9 8.3 7.4 7.4 7.3 7.3 7.2 7.2 --
   2005 2006 2007 06Q3 06Q4 07Q1 07Q2 07Q3 07Q4 
 Employment 4.2 yoy % ch 0.9 1.5 -- 1.6 1.6 1.8 1.8 1.9 --
 Shortage of labour 4.3 % 2.3 3.8 6.2 4.4 5.0 5.1 6.0 6.5 7.2
 Wages 4.4 yoy % ch 2.6 2.6 -- 2.6 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.6 --
5 International transactions  2005 2006 2007 Aug-07 Sept-07 Oct-07 Nov-07 Dec-07 Jan-08
 Export order books 5.1 Balance -15.6 -1.1 3.5 4.0 3.1 1.7 1.0 1.2 -1.7
 World trade 5.2 Index 158.5 173.4 185.0 189.6 185.5 190.0 188.6 187.1 --
 Exports of goods 5.3 Bn. EUR 1240.5 1386.8 1501.4 128.4 126.8 128.3 127.3 124.1 --
 Imports of goods 5.4 Bn. EUR 1225.2 1395.0 1470.8 125.0 123.5 126.0 125.4 126.2 --
 Trade balance 5.5 Bn. EUR 14.8 -9.3 28.3 3.5 3.4 2.2 2.0 -2.1 --
   2005 2006 2007 06Q3 06Q4 07Q1 07Q2 07Q3 07Q4 
 Exports of goods and services 5.6 qoq. % ch 4.5 7.7 -- 1.1 3.0 0.8 0.9 2.2 --
 Imports of goods and services 5.7 qoq. % ch 5.2 7.5 -- 1.7 1.7 1.2 0.3 2.6 --
   2005 2006 2007 Aug-07 Sept-07 Oct-07 Nov-07 Dec-07 Jan-08
 Current account balance 5.8 Bn. EUR 7.1 -13.7 14.9 3.2 0.6 3.1 2.3 -10.3 --
 Direct investment (net) 5.9 Bn. EUR -208.8 -136.5 -108.3 0.3 -37.4 21.3 10.6 -21.0 --
 Portfolio investment (net) 5.10 Bn. EUR 141.3 276.3 232.5 1.9 48.9 -56.1 8.7 1.5 --
6 Prices  2005 2006 2007 Aug-07 Sept-07 Oct-07 Nov-07 Dec-07 Jan-08
 HICP 6.1 yoy % ch 2.2 2.2 2.1 1.7 2.1 2.6 3.1 3.1 3.2
 Core HICP 6.2 yoy % ch 1.5 1.5 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.1 2.3 2.3 --
 Producer prices 6.3 yoy % ch 3.5 4.4 2.6 1.8 2.7 3.3 4.3 4.4 --
 Import prices6.4 Index 104.8 112.9 -- 115.1 116.1 116.1 117.9 -- --
7 Monetary and financial indicators  2005 2006 2007 Aug-07 Sept-07 Oct-07 Nov-07 Dec-07 Jan-08
 Interest rate (3 months) 7.1 % p.a. 2.1 2.9 3.9 4.5 4.7 4.7 4.6 4.8 4.5
 Bond yield (10 years) 7.2 % p.a. 3.4 3.8 4.2 4.3 4.2 4.3 4.1 4.3 4.0
 ECB repo rate 7.3  % p.a. 2.0 2.8 3.8 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0
 Stock markets 7.4  Index 3207.1 3793.3 4316.4 4220.6 4284.4 4430.8 4314.9 4386.4 4025.8
 M3 7.5 yoy % ch 7.4 8.5 11.1 11.5 11.3 12.3 12.4 11.6 11.5
 Credit to private sector (loans) 7.6 yoy % ch 8.1 11.0 10.8 11.2 11.0 11.3 11.1 11.2 11.1
 Exchange rate USD/EUR 7.7 Value 1.24 1.26 1.37 1.36 1.39 1.42 1.47 1.46 1.47
 Nominal effective exchange rate 7.8 Index 109.0 110.9 115.7 115.5 116.4 117.5 119.4 119.9 120.6
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Number Indicator Note Source 
1 Output   
1.1 Industrial confidence 
indicator  
Industry survey, average of balances to replies on production expectations, 
order books, and stocks (the latter with inverted sign) 
ECFIN 
1.2 Industrial production  Volume, excluding construction, wda Eurostat 
1.3 Gross domestic product  Volume (1995), seasonally adjusted Eurostat 
2 Private consumption   
2.1 Consumer confidence 
indicator  
Consumer survey, average of balances to replies on four questions (financial 
and economic situation, unemployment, savings over next 12 months) 
ECFIN 
2.2 Retail sales Volume, excluding motor vehicles, wda Eurostat 
2.3 Private consumption Volume (1995 prices), seasonally adjusted Eurostat 
3 Investment   
3.1 Capacity utilisation  In percent of full capacity, manufacturing, seasonally adjusted, survey data 
(collected in each January, April, July and October). 
ECFIN 
3.2 Gross fixed capital 
formation  
Volume (1995 prices), seasonally adjusted Eurostat 
3.3 Change in stocks In percent of GDP, volume (1995 prices), seasonally adjusted Eurostat 
4 Labour market   
4.1 Unemployment  In percent of total workforce, ILO definition, seasonally adjusted Eurostat 
4.2 Employment  Total employment, domestic concept, seasonally and working day adjusted Eurostat 
4.3 Shortage of labour Percent of firms in the manufacturing sector reporting a shortage of labour 
(unfilled job openings) as a constraint to production, seasonally adjusted  
ECFIN 
4.4 Wages  Wages and salaries. Labour cost index, industry and services (excluding 
public administration), nominal, working day adjusted  
ECFIN 
5 International transactions  
5.1 Export order books Industry survey; balance of positive and negative replies, seasonally adjusted ECFIN 
5.2 World trade Volume, 1998=100, seasonally adjusted CPB 
5.3 Exports of goods Bn. EUR, excluding intra euro-area trade, fob Eurostat 
5.4 Imports of goods  Bn. EUR, excluding intra euro-area trade, cif Eurostat 
5.5 Trade balance Bn. EUR, excluding intra euro-area trade, fob-cif Eurostat 
5.6 Exports of goods and 
services  
Volume (1995 prices), including intra euro-area trade, seasonally adjusted Eurostat 
5.7 Imports of goods and 
services  
Volume (1995 prices), including intra euro-area trade, seasonally adjusted Eurostat 
5.8 Current account balance  Bn. EUR, excluding intra euro-area transactions; before 1997 partly 
estimated 
ECB 
5.9 Direct investment   (net) Bn. EUR, excluding intra euro-area transactions ECB 
5.10 Portfolio investment  (net) Bn. EUR, excluding intra euro-area transactions ECB 
6 Prices   
6.1 HICP  Harmonised index of consumer prices Eurostat 
6.2 Core HICP Harmonised index of consumer prices, excluding energy and unprocessed 
food 
Eurostat 
6.3 Producer prices Without construction Eurostat 
6.4 Import prices Import unit value index for goods, 2000=100  Eurostat 
7 Monetary and financial indicators  
7.1 Interest rate  Percent p.a., 3-month interbank money market rate, period averages Ecowin 
7.2 Bond yield Percent p.a., 10-year government bond yields, lowest level prevailing in the 
euro area, period averages 
Ecowin 
7.3 ECB repo rate Percent p.a., minimum bid rate of the ECB, end of period Ecowin 
7.4 Stock markets  DJ Euro STOXX50 index, period averages Ecowin 
7.5 M3  Seasonally adjusted moving average moving average (3 last months)  ECB 
7.6 Credit to private sector 
(loans) 
MFI loans to euro-area residents excluding MFIs and general government, 
monthly values: month end values, annual values: annual averages 
ECB 
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7.7 Exchange rate USD/EUR  Period averages ECB 
7.8 Nominal effective exchange 
rate 
Against 13 other industrialised countries, double export weighted, 1995 = 
100, increase (decrease): appreciation (depreciation) 
ECFIN 
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